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ABSTRACT
CASCADING FAILURES AND CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS FOR SMART GRID
SECURITY
SHIVA POUDEL
2016
The modern electric power grid has become highly integrated in order to increase
the reliability of power transmission from the generating units to end consumers. In
addition, today’s power system are facing a rising appeal for the upgrade to a highly
intelligent generation of electricity networks commonly known as Smart Grid. However,
the growing integration of power system with communication network also brings
increasing challenges to the security of modern power grid from both physical and cyber
space. Malicious attackers can take advantage of the increased access to the monitoring
and control of the system and exploit some of the inherent structural vulnerability of
power grids. Therefore, determining the most vulnerable components (e.g., buses or
generators or transmission lines) is critically important for power grid defense. This
dissertation introduces three different approaches to enhance the security of the smart grid.
Motivated by the security challenges of the smart grid, the first goal of this thesis is
to facilitate the understanding of cascading failure and blackouts triggered by
multi-component attacks, and to support the decision making in the protection of a
reliable and secure smart grid. In this work, a new definition of load is proposed by taking
power flow into consideration in comparison with the load definition based on degree or
network connectivity. Unsupervised learning techniques (e.g., K-means algorithm and
xiv
self-organizing map (SOM)) are introduced to find the vulnerable nodes and performance
comparison is done with traditional load based attack strategy.
Second, an electrical distance approach is introduced to find the vulnerable branches
during contingencies. A new network structure different than the original topological
structure is formed based on impedance matrix which is referred as electrical structure.
This structure is pruned to make it size compatible with the topological structure and the
common branches between the two different structures are observed during contingency
analysis experiments. Simulation results for single and multiple contingencies have been
reported and the violation of line limits during single and multiple outages are observed
for vulnerability analysis.
Finally, a cyber-physical power system (CPS) testbed is introduced as an accurate
cyber-physical environment in order to observe the system behavior during malicious
attacks and different disturbance scenarios. The application areas and architecture of
proposed CPS testbed have been discussed in details. The testbed’s efficacy is then
evaluated by conducting real-time cyber attacks and exploring the impact in a physical
system. The possible mitigation strategies are suggested for defense against the attack and
protect the system from being unstable.
1
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of Smart Grid
The power system has been evolved for more than one hundred years. With its
development and extension from the 20th century, at present, U.S. interconnected system
include about 2,000 electric distribution utilities, more than 300,000 miles of transmission
lines and more than 7,200 power plants [1]. In addition, there is not a single national
electric grid in the United States and it is fragmented. Electric infrastructure today is
aging, outmoded and overstressed. Right now, we are using the 19th-century system from
the days of Edison and Westinghouse that uses 20th-century equipment in an effort to
keep up with a 21st-century economy [2]. The existing electric grid is a strictly
hierarchical system in which power plants at the top of chain ensure power delivery to the
consumers at the bottom of the chain. Simple, it is a single way pipeline where the sources
have no real-time information about their end points which is, therefore, over-engineered
to withstand maximum anticipated peak demand. The power industry is facing great
challenges at present in terms of the economy, reliability and efficiency issues.
This section introduces the smart grid and its advantages over the traditional power
grid. The next-generation electricity grid, commonly known as “smart grid” is expected to
address the major shortcomings of the existing electric grid. Smart grid is a modern
electric power grid that uses optimized control algorithm, smart meters, bi-directional
communication between the source and destination of the utility. The U.S Department of
Energy (DOE) has identified seven principles characteristics of the modern electric grid
which includes self-healing, consumer participation, attack resistance, power quality for
2
Figure 1.1. A general schematic diagram of smart grid.
21st century needs, accommodation of generation and storage, enabling of markets and
optimization of assets [3]. Fig. 1.1 shows a basic view of the smart grid that uses
communication and information technology embedded with the power system, IEDs for
sensing and monitoring purposes, integration of renewable energy and demand response.
These technologies are used to enhance all the areas of the electric grid, like generation,
transmission, distribution and even electric markets [4].
With the help of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), smart grid makes the
power system a two-way interactive grid. And, with this interactivity, power companies
are able to regulate the supply in real time depending on the energy demand. So, there is
no need to generate excessive power anymore, which reduces the power waste in the grid
and maximizes the power supply efficiency. Also, costumers can adjust their power usage
according to the real-time pricing with the help of smart meters and time-based pricing.
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This power usage habit will reduce the peak demand by shifting some part of power
utilizing time. In addition, with the application of advanced control algorithms in smart
grid, it is possible to coordinate renewable energies and electric vehicles into the grid.
This makes the power grid more robust during the fluctuate demand from costumers. The
wide area measurement system (WAMS) based on phasor measurement units (PMUs) and
accurate GPS-based timing are being deployed to accurately analyze the flow of electricity
through bulk power system. Similarly, in the substation layer, the advanced
communications paradigms and improved field devices like intelligent electronic devices
(IEDs) are being used. This allows multicast transmission of device status and helps
perform sophisticated operations such as grid protection.
1.2 Smart Grid Security Challenges
Smart grid is expected to be more economical, reliable and efficient as compared to
the traditional grid because of the technologies like AMI, WAMS, and automated
substation. However, these technologies provide some target point for attack and increase
the security issues. For example, a smart meter, PMU data, communication protocols in a
substation can be the point of interest for an attacker to compromise the power grid
elements (buses or transmission lines). Hence, the coupling of the power infrastructure
with communication and information technology will introduce some new problems of
which the most imminent is the cyber security issues and physical vulnerabilities growing
in the smart grid.
Cascading failure in power transmission usually begins when one part of the system
fails and shifts its load to nearby elements. Each component has a loading failure
4
threshold above which it fails. After any disturbance in the system, the loading of the
component is increased and if it is above the threshold value, it fails and the load is
transferred to remaining system components. It is a common effect seen in high voltage
system where the failure process cascades through the power grid components like a
ripple on a pond and continues until all of the system’s components are compromised or
none of the components have a loading value above their threshold. North American
Electric Reliability Council (NERC) standard [5] requires the power system to
demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability, and there should not occur any
cascading or uncontrolled separation following the single contingency. This means it is
not possible to cause cascading failure if any of the single components is compromised.
However, because of openness and complexity of the envisioned smart grid, it is possible
for intelligent attackers to carry out well-coordinated cyber, physical or cyber-physical
attacks to initiate cascading failures which ultimately leads to large scale blackouts. With
the use of sophisticated communications and control schemes in the power system,
network complexity is increasing which enables new flexibility in operation in terms of
reliability and efficiency. But, this might also contribute new ways that the system could
fail or change in system behavior. Northeast blackout in 2003 [6], European blackout in
2006 [7], Northern India blackout in 2012 [8] are some examples of large blackouts
caused by cascading failures. These examples show how the power grids are operated
under stressed conditions and hence more effort is needed to understand and mitigate the
risk of cascading failures.
Contingency analysis is a traditional approach to testing all contingencies
sequentially to evaluate system performance and reliability. CA simulates the outage of
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particular grid components and evaluates the consequences following the outage [9].
North American Reliability corporation requires the system operator to maintain N−1
contingency criterion. However, multiple outage contingencies are becoming increasingly
relevant because of the way the power system is being operated [10] and the growing
threats from cyberspace that attackers are gaining more useful information to knock down
multiple grid components. Usually, a power system is guaranteed to be N−1 secure due to
computational complexity in evaluating multiple contingencies for a large power system.
In particular, the list size or possible number of events, C for k contingency is given by,
C =
(
N
k
)
=
N!
k!(N− k)!
(1.1)
where N is the total number of components (nodes or branches) in power system and k is
the number of outaged/failed components. Hence, even for a modestly sized system with
N = 5000, the number of combinations for the double outage is around 12.5 million. So, it
is required to model the power system efficiently and effectively for simulating its
behavior during multiple components failure.
Although the smart grid network introduces enhancements and improved
capabilities to the conventional power grid, it is becoming more complex and vulnerable
to different kinds of cyber attacks. It is also considered as a typical cyber-physical system
due to tight coupling between ICT and physical power system. Vulnerabilities with ICT
allows attackers to access the network and break confidentiality and integrity of data for
interrupting the service. There are numerous access points within the smart grid which
facilitate the attackers to compromise the system through potential cyber attacks. Recent
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research has proved that an intentional cyber-attack can cause a significant impact on the
power grid in terms of stability, efficiency and economic operation [11], [12], [13]. So, the
interdependency between cyber and physical domains must be understood in order to
implement and evaluate realistic cyber attack-defense experiments.
1.3 Motivations and Contributions
Determining the most vulnerable components (e.g., buses or generators) is critically
important for power grid defense. Since it is infeasible to handle multi-contingency cases
in large scale power grid due to computational complexity, researchers have been looking
for optimal approaches to have a balance between cost of power grid modeling and
efficiency of security analysis. In this work, a new definition of load is proposed by taking
power flow into consideration in comparison with the load definition based on degree or
network connectivity. Unsupervised learning techniques (e.g., K-means algorithm and
self-organizing map (SOM)) are introduced to cluster the nodes (i.e., buses) in the
IEEE-39 bus and IEEE-57 bus benchmarks. Then most vulnerable node in each cluster is
determined based on their load information to form initial victim set. percentage of failure
(PoF) is used to compare the performance of clustering based approach and traditional
load-based approach during cascading failure process. With the simulation results, the
unsupervised learning (clustering based) approaches are more efficient in finding the most
vulnerable nodes and our proposed definition of load is relatively useful in studying power
grid security
The Large-scale power system outage is one of the most catastrophic disaster in
modern society that results in enormous damage of billions per year for US economy
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alone. So, system operators are required to maintain plans for any unforeseen events in the
power system that forces power system to operate without reliability. Contingency
analysis is one of the well-known methods to paint the future scenarios for any
contingencies in the power system. However, a large number of possible N− k
combinations make their assessment computationally prohibitive. A new method to search
most vulnerable transmission lines efficiently based on electrical distance is introduced.
Specifically, a new electrical network is first built based on the impedance matrix (by
inverting admittance matrix). Then, this impedance matrix is pruned based on the number
of connection in topology network. Next, the common connections in two different
structures (i.e., electrical network and topology network) will be observed for contingency
experiments. Our results verify that violations of transmission lines limit due to
contingencies are mostly associated with those common branches. In addition, voltage
profile is further studied to validate that the vulnerable transmission lines found above are
critical in power system stability.
The next-generation electricity grid, commonly known as “smart grid” is expected
to address the major shortcomings of the existing electric grid. The existing power grid is
upgraded into a smart grid through an intelligent communication infrastructures, layers of
information, extensive computing and sensing technologies. Thus, these cyber and power
components of grid together constitute a complex cyber-physical system and it is critical
to understand the interdependencies among these domains. In addition, this integration
also increases the risk of cyber attacks and introduces new vulnerabilities to the power
system. Hence, it is always necessary to understand power system phenomenon during
any kind of disturbances. Researchers need a power system test bed which can provide a
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real-time platform for simulating different power system events and attacks. In this work,
a real-time cyber-physical testbed is introduced to study about the power system security
experiments. Various research applications supported by the proposed testbed has been
presented. The impact of the possible cyber attack on physical power grid has been
analyzed and possible mitigation strategy is suggested.
1.4 The Structure of Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the application of
computational intelligence for cascading failures in a power system is discussed where
unsupervised learning is adopted for multi-contingency analysis. A detailed description of
the simulated model and performance comparison of attack strategies will be provided.
Chapter 3 discusses the new approach for searching vulnerable branches in the power
system. The proposed algorithm is discussed and applied to various standard test cases.
The contingency experiment and transient stability results are presented in order to verify
the proposed approach. Similarly, Chapter 4 will describe the architecture and application
of proposed testbed developed at South Dakota State University where power system
security experiments are investigated in real time. Finally, conclusions of the thesis and
possible future works are presented in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2 UNSUPERVISED LEARNING FOR POWER GRID SECURITY
2.1 Introduction
The electric power grid interconnect generating units and load over large
geographical areas into an entity to achieve efficient and reliable power supply. With
thousands of substations and interconnected transmission lines, the modern electric power
grid is regarded as one of the most complex networks. U.S. power grid as of today
consists of more than 9,200 electric generating units with more than 1 million MW of
generating capacity which is connected to more than 300,000 miles of transmission lines
[14]. The electric power grid is regarded as an engineering marvel, however, for meeting
the nation’s energy demand efficiently and reliably, aging infrastructures need extensive
upgrades. A smart electric power grid, with intelligent use of information, increases the
connectivity, automation, and coordination among generating plants, networks within the
grid and consumers. With the purpose of adding resiliency to the existing electric power
system, information and communication technologies (ICTs) are introduced and electric
grid is becoming smarter these days. With the help of ICT network, smart grid provides
better situational awareness during emergencies such as storms, earthquakes, and terrorist
attacks. One of the significant features of the smart grid, in contrast to the traditional
power system, is the large scale deployment of a two-way communication network
connecting both the power plants and the end consumers. This interactive system will
enhance the delivery of quality power, optimize the efficiency and stability at a lower cost
with the help of computer-based automation.
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2.1.1 Attack threats in Smart Grid
The smart grid boosts not only the economic benefits but also a growing number of
potential threats from the cyber-space [15]. Because of the huge volume of data flowing
through the power transmission network, they are more vulnerable to data interception and
unauthorized modification, which can be utilized by an attacker to disrupt power system
operations. Due to the large amount of information being exchanged in the network, an
attacker with enough knowledge of the power grid can penetrate into the network and find
the vulnerable components for initiating an attack. These smart attacks if wisely designed
and launched successfully, can compromise some critical components causing a disastrous
impact on the power grid. Recently, malicious attacks against power grids have drawn
growing attention from many aspects, e.g., power industry, educational institutions,
government and even the public. Since the smart grid generally referred as
next-generation power transmission system are relying on communication networks and
smart meters, great concerns regarding cyber intrusions are raised. Such intrusions and
physical sabotage can be controlled by the attackers to target on critical substations and
transmission lines to cause a large-scale power outage. Attackers are referred to as those
people who have a strong will to carry out attacks in order to disable the power grid and
they might be individuals, terrorists or any hostile countries. Individual attacks and
terrorist attacks are highly possible, and some of them have already happened in past. In
2013, a 37-year old Arkansas man launched three attacks on local power grid [16].
Specifically, the attacker was interested in high voltage transmission lines and substation.
In addition, on April 16, 2013, group of snipers assaulted an electrical substation near San
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Jose, California [17]. They fired 17 giant transformers which then took a nearly a month
to repair causing loss of 15 million USD. This incident served as a warning sign to power
industry in the community. However, attacks from hostile countries are less often than
individual and terrorist attacks. But, once they happen can take U.S. power grid down
even for months [18].
One of the vulnerabilities of the smart grid that could be taken advantage of by the
attackers is the possibility of cascading failure events events in power systems. During the
cascading failure, a few failed components can trigger the collapse of normal power
transmission and consequently results in a blackout. Because of the interconnected
structure of modern grid, the result of an attack can trigger a cascading failure or a
blackout as it allows the local failures to propagate throughout the system. These cases
often occur in an unpredictable manner. Although US government claims that the electric
power grid in the U.S. is 99.97 % reliable, still allows room for frequent power
interruptions that cost $150 million each year [14]. Although many works have been done
to enhance the security and reliability of the U.S. grid, major blackouts are still inevitable.
Table 2.1 shows the notable blackouts in U.S. history for past 50 years.
2.1.2 Vulnerability of power grids to cascading failure
Power sector vulnerability has been a key issue in society for over a decade. A
component failure may trigger a cascade of failures across the grid and lead to a large
blackout. Cascading failures in large-scale electric power systems are a succession of
transmission and generation outages, one precipitating another [19]. In order to provide
continuously and high-quality electricity service to end consumers, the power system is
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Table 2.1. History of Major United States Blackouts
Date Location Cause Consequence
Nov. 1965
Northeastern of U.S.,
Human errors 30 million people
Ontario in Canada
Jul.1977 New York City
An electrical substation 9 million people
stroke by lighting without power
Jan.1981 Utah
Knocking out 1.5 million people
transmission lines lost power
Oct.1989 Northern California
Substations damaged 1.4 million people
by earthquakes lost power
Jan.1989
Northeast of Transmission towers 3.5 million people
North America destroyed by ice affected
Aug. 2003
Northeast of U.S., Transmission lines 55 million people
Ontario in Canada tripped by trees without power
Sept. 2011 California Technical error
7 million people
without power
Jul. 2012
New York, Hurricane Sandy 10 million people
New Jersey without power
designed to operate securely during any single critical component failure, which is called
the N−1 criterion. However, an unexpected rare disturbance in unfavorable
circumstances may trigger a series of device outages (cascading failures), or even a system
breakdown resulting in a widespread power blackout. Thus, cascading failure is
considered to be the leading reason of large-scale power outages. As reported in [20],
failure to perform a critical redistribution of power for an overloaded transmission line
resulted in the major blackout that affected more than 55 million people in the Northeast
American region. Cascading failure refers to a sequence of dependent failures of
individual components that successively weakens the power system and it includes the
initial failure/s and dependent failures.
The initial failure/s can occur on substations, transmission lines, or other
components. The cause of initial failures can be random like natural disasters (e.g.,
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earthquakes), operational errors, equipment failures or can be malicious attacks like cyber
intrusions or physical sabotages from the attackers perspective. Malicious attacks are
more powerful and harmful than random cause since the attack can be controlled in terms
of initiating events and a different number of targets. Dependent failures are triggered by
initial failure/s. Many grid components are failed subsequently after initial failure/s which
is referred to as failure propagation and the sequence of cascading event is uncertain [21].
This is because the power system always requires a balance between supply and demand.
The initial failure of critical components could cause large-scale power redistribution
which causes subsequent failures. A typical cascading-failure is divided into three stages:
the pre-cascading stage, the cascading stage, and the post-cascading stage.
The pre-cascading stage refers to all events and preconditions before the cascading
process happens. This stage is characterized by the gradual weakening of the system as
different events occur. Typical events are bad weather, an unanticipated demand increase,
unscheduled outage of generators or transmission lines, insufficient right-of-way
maintenance, serious transmission congestion, hidden failures of protection systems. At
the pre-cascading stage, a power system is stressed and the probability of cascading
outages increases rapidly.
During cascading outage, a system-wide outage sequence is usually triggered by
outages occurring at key locations. There will be series of uncontrollable tripping of
system elements spreading from initial location to entire power grid network. The final
phase of the cascading failures is the breakdown of the entire or the major portion of the
system.
The restorative process of the power systems after the system breakdown is referred
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as post cascading stage. The restorative process might take few hours to days and
sometimes even weeks depending on its location, the degree of damage, and propagation
size. In this thesis, the focus is on the understanding of the pre-cascading and cascading
stage. Post cascading stage is beyond the scope of our current work.
The electric substation is the major components in any power grids. The reliability
of power grid is strongly related to the security of the substation. In reality, substations are
confronting various risks, e.g., natural disaster [22], cyber attack [23], physical attacks
[16] [17], and so forth. Hence it is an urgent task to investigate the cascading failure from
substation perspective. An attacker’s goal during the attack is to identify the set of target
nodes whose simultaneous failure causes maximum damage to the electric power grid. So,
an attacker always targets certain substations to initiate a cascading failure that maximizes
the number of customers without electricity and causes tremendous economic loss. If an
attacker wants to launch successful and powerful attacks, they need to have prior
knowledge about following questions.
• In what ways can attackers initially attack the targets?
• Which cascading model is the best one to predict the attack performance and
quantify the damage of attack?
• Which component(s) should be identified as targets and compromised initially?
Answering any of aforementioned questions needs a significant amount of research.
Since in the current literature, the electric power grid is considered as a cyber-physical
system, and there is growing attention against cyber-physical attacks [24], [25]. Also,
there are different models which have been developed previously by using different
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information of power grids [26], [27]. However, in this dissertation two different
cascading model is used to evaluate the attack performance and it mainly focuses on the
third question from the attackers’ perspective. It is also assumed that an attacker has
enough knowledge about the power grid and cascading models.
2.1.3 Related work
This section will briefly review some of the existing researches related to smart grid
security issues. Smart grid, as an integration of power transmission networks and
communication networks, can be vulnerable in both physical and cyber space [24]. These
include challenges in accurate measurements and monitoring of power system states,
power transmission reliability against disruptive events, detection of malicious events as
well as control of access and authentication.
A significant amount of research work has been done and numerous issues have
been satisfactorily resolved for smart grid security. But, there are still many emerging
challenges in the applications of smart grid especially ensuring its security from various
power system attacks causing cascading failures and even blackout. This slows down the
effort of its installation and replacement of traditional power grids. According to [21],
uncertainties of blackouts are associated with three sources: (a) initiating or triggering
events, (b) sequence of dependent events, and (c) ultimate cost. A probabilistic approach
to cascading failure was proposed in [28] to predict the “next” event in cascading
phenomenon. However, the authors have neglected the uncertainties with the initial
triggering event. An extended topological approach was proposed for assessing the
vulnerability of power grid components during cascading failures with limited knowledge
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about dynamics of power system information [29]. Transient stability and voltage security
assessment using machine learning was studied in [30]. Random sampling techniques
were considered for screening all the operating situations of the power system. The use of
modular neural networks and multilayer perceptrons (MLP) helps to detect and recognize
intrusions in computer networks with higher accuracy [31]. A distributed smart grid attack
strategies to destabilize power system was provided to create cascading failure within
multiple targets of the system [32]. Optimal node attack strategy (NAS) based on DC
power flow analysis was used to investigate the vulnerability of nodes [33], where the
authors proposed a new metric called risk graph for showing the hidden relationship in
nodes. In [34] combination of unsupervised and supervised learning was used for the
online security evaluation of N−1 contingency. Generally, higher order contingency is
one of the major contributions to cascading failures and the identification of the
contingency set is the foremost step for studying power grid security [35]. The application
of well-known higher order contingency (N− k) used for searching k critical components
has the drawback of high computational and analysis cost. To overcome the complexity of
assessing all N− k contingency combinations, risk analysis methodologies like
cluster-based approach, enumeration of likely cascade paths, uniform sampling, and bulk
analysis methods are discussed [21]. During the study of cascading failure in the power
grid, it has been recognized that topological structure of power grid has a key impact on
the propagation of cascading events [36], [37]. Utilization of spatial features of electric
power grid can help to analyze the electrical system behavior in cascading failure
scenarios [38].
In order to study the cascading process for power grid security, one needs to define
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load associated with buses (nodes) so that it helps to keep track of which nodes is knocked
down in successive time steps. Load of a particular node in the complex network can be
defined as overall transmission capabilities, which is also referred to as extended
betweenness of that node [39]. A new model was proposed to define a load of a node as a
product of its own degree and sum of the degree of its immediate neighbors [38], [40]. A
degradation model based on degree was proposed to evaluate the stress on a particular
node due to the failure of neighboring nodes. This stress on node was supposed to
decrease its life expectancy analogous to “wear out” process [41]. However, these
definitions of load are based on network connectivity and ignore the power flow governed
by basic circuit laws in the power system. So, these definitions may not be realistic and
useful from power system viewpoint as they do not take power flow analysis into
consideration.
2.2 Power Grid Modeling
In this section, the two different models of power grid used in the cascading failure
experiment analysis are described.
2.2.1 System model
Among the power system model available for cascading analysis, in this work the
topology-based model will be compared with proposed model during the cascading failure
analysis. In order to represent the power grid as a topological network, it is assumed that a
substation in the power grid is referred as a node and a transmission line connecting
substation will be regarded as a branch. A substation may consist of a generator, load or it
may be simply a pass-through transmission substation. In addition, a load of a particular
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node is also defined, on which the process of cascading failure depends on. The two
different definition of load used in this work will be explained in the following section.
2.2.1.1 Definition of load based on network connectivity
First, a load of a particular node is defined based on degree (connectivity). Previous
work on cascading failures of high-level power grid structure has suggested that a load of
a particular node is related to the connectivity with/of its immediate neighbors [27], [42].
It suggests that a node, either connecting to a number of immediate neighbors or whose
direct neighbors have a greater connection, will take a greater portion of the load during
power delivery. Hence, in this model, a load of a particular node is defined as a product of
its degree and sum of the degree of its neighboring nodes. Let kv be the degree of a
particular node, the initial load, Lv is defined by,
Lv = kv ∗∑km, m ∈ Nbr(v) (2.1)
where Nbr(v) is the set of neighbouring nodes of a particular node v. If one or more nodes
are knocked down, they are assumed to be out of service and the load flowing through that
node gets proportionally redistributed to the neighboring nodes. So, the nearby nodes
must take up the slack for the failed node. Hence the load gets redistributed according to
the model proposed in [27] and the load of immediate neighbors is updated with some
additional load as defined by following equations,
δm =
Lm
∑Lm
∗Lv (2.2)
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Figure 2.1. Illustration of load definition and redistribution according to network connec-
tivity
L
′
m = Lm +δm (2.3)
where Lv is the initial lode of failure node, δm is the additional load assigned to
neighbouring nodes due to failure of node v. In order to explain the definition and
distribution of load, a numeric example for equations 2.1 and 2.2 is shown in Fig. 2.1. It
represents a small portion of IEEE 39 bus system where buses (nodes) are represented by
circle and number inside the circle represent the bus number. The number next to each
node in black is the initial load of that particular node. For example, the load of node 16 is
given by,
L(16) = k(16)×{k(17)+ k(15)+ k(19)+ k(24)+ k(21)}
L(16) = 5×{3+2+3+2+2}= 60
When node 16 is failed either by fault or some direct attacks, it will be disconnected
from the power grid. This means the connection between this node with its neighboring
nodes will also be removed since no power could be delivered through it. So, based on
equation (2.3), the load of the failed node will be redistributed to its immediate neighbors.
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The number in blue is the extra load that will be added on each of the neighboring nodes
of node 16. The newly added load is proportional to the initial load of neighboring nodes
in accordance with defined equation.
2.2.1.2 Definition of load based on Power Flow
The first model is a pure topological model that neglects the fundamental electric
laws behind power flow. Since these models typically assume that cascades propagate
locally, they can be misleading [43]. For instance, if any component x fails, the next
component to be overloaded and fail is one that is topologically connected to x. However,
as suggested by [44], real cascading failure propagates non-locally which means the next
component to fail after x may be hundred of miles away from it. In this model, a load of a
particular node is defined as the burden of total MW that it carries during its healthy state.
When electric power from the generating units is delivered to end consumers, it can travel
through different routes through different buses (nodes). The node may have some MW of
real load, or a generator, or it may be simply a transmission path delivering power to other
substations. Assume D is the demand present at a particular node v, I1, I2, ..., Ik be the
amount of power flowing into node v from k neighbouring nodes and O1, O2, ..., Om be the
amount of power flowing out from node v to m neighbouring nodes. An initial load that a
particular node carries during normal operation of the grid is defined by equation (2.4).
Information regarding power flowing into the node I, flowing out of node O, and demand
in that node D can be obtained by running power flow experiments. The power flow is
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presented in Fig. 2.2 and the load definition is provided as,
L(v) =
k
∑
i=1
Ii =
m
∑
j=1
O j +D, v ∈ n (2.4)
where v is a given node of a system with n nodes.
 
Figure 2.2. Load burden of a node using power flow information.
The attack model for this case is similar to that as described earlier in section
2.2.1.1. But, the redistribution of load after failure of particular node is based on circuit
laws and independent of the initial load of neighboring nodes as described in equation
(2.2). Also, this redistribution is not only limited to adjacent network components [45]
and despite overloading, there may be a situation in cascading analysis where a
neighboring node may get functionally disconnected from the system causing load
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shedding at those nodes or form isolated networks [46]. After each node is taken off from
the system because of an attack or cascading failure process, the load redistribution in the
remaining network takes place according to power flow method. A well-known
Full-Newton method is used for analyzing the system behavior after the loss of a
particular node. The relationship between node current I and node voltage E for a
particular node i in a network of n nodes is given by the following linear equation,
Ii =
n
∑
k=1
YikEk (2.5)
where Yik is an element of the admittance matrix joining nodes i and k. Following equation
(4.6), complex power at node i is given by,
Si = EiI∗i (2.6)
Pi + jQi = Ei
n
∑
k=1
Y ∗ikE
∗
k (2.7)
Equation (3.3) represents real and reactive power flowing in any branch and it is used to
update the branch flow according to Ybus after any outage of node(s). So, the survived
nodes will have new value of load assigned to them. In this work, only real power is taken
into account for the calculation of load of the nodes as shown in Fig. 2.2.
2.2.2 Cascading tree
As the load is redistributed in the network according to the model described in
previous sections, this will cause some of the surviving nodes in the grid to be overloaded.
When a node is overloaded beyond some predefined capacity, it is also taken off from the
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system and all the branches or transmission lines connected with that node will be
disconnected. The capacity C(v) of each node is defined which is directly proportional to
its initial load L(v) that it carries in a healthy network as,
C(v) = αL(v), v ∈ n (2.8)
where α ≥ 1 is the threshold of overloading ratio, above which a node is considered failed
and referred as system capacity. A Higher value of α means the higher capability of a
node to resist perturbations. The failure propagation will continue in the system as long as
new overloaded node appears in the grid leading to cascading process. A universal system
tolerance is assigned to define capacity of all nodes within the network as there is no
ground truth for the practical value of system tolerance. So, during the simulation for
cascading failure analysis different values of α will be used.
Finally, when a number of nodes are failed, the concept of “round” is used to help to
describe the successive propagation of cascading failure. The definition of a round is
illustrated in Fig. 2.3. The very first set of failed nodes are the victims in the initial attack
as chosen by an attacker. Then the nodes knocked down by the cascading failure of initial
victims will be regarded as the victims of the second round, so on and so forth. In this
way, failed nodes at different rounds of a cascading process form a tree-like structure
where the “child” nodes are the direct victims of their parent node’s failure.
In summary, the overall cascading failure simulator and concept of round can be
generalized in following steps:
1. Trigger a multi-node cascading failure by knocking down some victims in the grid.
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Figure 2.3. Illustration of cascading failure in successive steps
2. Calculate the load redistribution because of failures and mark fatally overloaded
nodes as failed in the next round.
3. Disconnect failed nodes and branches from the grid.
4. Repeat step 2 and 3 until the process reaches a final stabilized state.
2.2.3 Evaluation metric
As it is desired identify the most critical power grid components from the cascading
failure perspective, the damage of the attack needs to be quantified. The final
percentage/fraction of failure is used in the power grid with respect to system tolerance α ,
denoted as PoF, as the assessment metric:
PoF = 1− N
′
N
(2.9)
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where N is a total number of nodes in the system before the attack and N
′
is a number of
nodes survived the attack. For each attack simulated, the value of PoF is measured after
the cascading failure stops at the final stabilized state. The physical meaning of PoF is
related to the size of blackout as several components are knocked down during the
cascading failure process. According to the previous definition of “round”, a cascading
“tree” with more “leaves”, i.e., a higher value of PoF at the final round, indicates that the
initial victims have compromised a large number of grid components during cascading
failure causing a larger blackout. By using this measurement, it is able to illustrate the
effectiveness of the proposed approach and identify the critical components in the power
grid during multi-victim attack scenarios.
2.3 Multi-component Attack Strategies
The primary goal of this research is to analyze the cascading failures during various
multi-victim attack strategies. Traditional load based attack and clustering based attack
are compared for both definitions of load, i.e., load based on degree or connectivity and
load based on power flow. After the cascading failure experiment, the performance of two
different attack strategies is compared for two different power grid models separately as
shown in Fig. 2.4.
2.3.1 Traditional load based attack strategy
The attack on nodes with the highest load is a common attack strategy and is based
on the fact that the failure of a node with the largest value of load causes a significant
amount of load to be redistributed among its neighbors. The optimal strategy in this attack
is to select the desired number of victim nodes in descending order of loads and to remove
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Figure 2.4. Attack strategies on IEEE-39 and IEEE-57 bus system
them from the network. Authors in [47] studied cascading failures in North American
power grid using information from its network structure. Loss of single high-load or
high-degree substation reduced the efficiency of the power grid by 25%. It seems
reasonable to choose victim nodes according to the load, but one should always remember
that network topology plays a crucial role in complex network failures.
2.3.2 Unsupervised learning based attack strategy
Unsupervised learning method draws inferences from the datasets without labeled
responses or without external help. By contrast with supervised learning, there are no
explicit target outputs associated with each input. Since clustering or partitioning of data
in the absence of class labels is often a requirement, unsupervised learning tries to build a
model from data without any external help [48]. Among different approaches to
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unsupervised learning, it is used for clustering analysis. The commonly used unsupervised
learning algorithms in data clustering are k-means and self-organizing map (SOM).
2.3.2.1 K-means Clustering
K-means clustering (MacQueen, 1967) is a method commonly used to partition n
data set into k groups in which each data belongs to the cluster with nearest mean [49]. It
is one of the simplest unsupervised learning algorithms for solving the clustering problem.
The procedure follows a simple way to classify given a set of data to a certain number of
clusters fixed apriori. K-means algorithm attempts to find the cluster centers so as to
minimize the within-cluster sum of square (WCSS) distance. Simply, its objective is to
minimize the following objective function,
J =
k
∑
j=1
n j
∑
i=1
|V ji −C j|
2 (2.10)
where V ji is the i
th input of jth cluster, C j is the centroid of a particular cluster, k is the
total number of clusters, and n j is the number of data set belonging to jth cluster. The
algorithm behind this objective can be summarized as:
Step 1. Initialization: Choose C1, C2, ..., Ck as initial cluster centers. They represent
the “temporary” means of the clusters. The dimension of initial centers is same as that of
the input vector.
Step 2. Assignment: Each observation (data set) is assigned to a closest cluster by
calculating the squared Euclidean distance.
D = |V (t)−C(t)| (2.11)
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where V (t) is the sample input vector at tth iteration, C(t) is the weight vector of cluster
center.
Step 3. Update: The new centroid of the clusters are calculated using (2.12)
C j =
1
n j
∑
Vi∈ j
Vi (2.12)
where n j is the number of data set (Vi) belonging to a particular cluster j after assignment.
Since the arithmetic mean is a least square estimator, this will minimize the WCSS
objective in equation (2.10).
Step 4. Convergence: Repeat step 2 and 3 until there is no further change in position
of centroid of each cluster.
2.3.2.2 Self Organizing Map
Self-organizing map commonly known as Kohonen network is a class of artificial
neural network (ANN) in an unsupervised learning category [50]. It is an effective
platform for visualizing and analyzing high dimensional data. The two modes of operation
of SOM are training and mapping. During the training process, the neurons are settled at
different locations in the lattice. During the mapping process, the input vector is clustered.
The number of neurons depends on the number of initial victims targeted for multi-victim
attack. The training of neurons occurs in several steps as described below.
Step 1. Initialization: Before training, each neuron’s weight needs to be initialized.
Among various initialization processes, random initialization approach is used for its
simplicity. So, the weight of the neurons is set to small standardized random values such
that 0 < W < 1, where W is the weight vector of the neuron. The dimension of weight
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vector is same as that of the input vector.
Step 2. Best Matching Unit (BMU): After initialization, a sample input vector is
selected from the set of training data and presented as input to SOM. Each neuron is now
examined to find which one’s weight is closest to the current input. The winner is called
the BMU. To determine this unit, Euclidean distance between each neurons’ weight vector
and current input vector being presented to lattice is calculated as,
Dist = |V (t)−W (t)| (2.13)
where V (t) is the sample input vector at tth iteration and W (t) is the weight vector of
neuron. The neuron that minimizes this distance is tagged as BMU.
Step 3. Parameters Update: Now, a neighborhood function is defined to calculate
which neurons are within the neighborhood of BMU. The Gaussian kernel function is
used as neighborhood function which adjusts the weights of neurons based on its distance
to BMU. It is defined by,
H(σ) =
1√
2πσ
e−δ
2/2σ2 (2.14)
where δ is the distance between the neuron and BMU.
A unique feature of this learning is that the area of the neighborhood and learning
rate decreases over time. The neighborhood size (i.e., σo) and SOM learning rate (i.e., Lo)
are updated using exponential decay function defined by,
L(t) = Loe−t/λ1 (2.15)
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σ(t) = σoe−t/λ2 (2.16)
where t is number of iterations and λ1 is the time constant whose value depends on σo, λ1
= 100/log(σo).
Step 4. Convergence: After the parameters are updated, neurons are dragged
towards input vector to adjust their weight. Since Gaussian kernel is used as neighborhood
function, the weight of the neurons closer to BMU will be updated as,
W (t +1) =W (t)+H(σ)L(t)(V (t)−W (t)) (2.17)
At this stage, the training of neurons is finished and they will find their own positions in
the lattice. Each of them represents the centroid of clusters. Finally, the mapping process
starts in which the input vector will be clustered according to the Euclidean distance.
2.4 Simulation Results
The IEEE-39 bus and IEEE-57 bus system are studied for analyzing the
multi-victim attack from two different strategies. A simulator is built in MATLAB 2014a
environment for simulating load redistribution process for different attack strategies. For
preserving the topological information in both benchmark system, X and Y coordinates
for different nodes are extracted. A system case with branch and bus state for 39 bus
system is obtained from Illinois Center for a Smarter Electric Grid (ICSEG) [51] and 57
bus system from Matpower [52].
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2.4.1 Parameters and environment setup
The coordinates of buses (nodes) for both test cases are normalized by using
following equation as,
z =
z−min(Z)
max(Z)−min(Z)
, z ∈ Z (2.18)
where z stands for either X or Y coordinate.
We plan to attack two different nodes in IEEE-39 bus system so the number of
neurons in SOM training are 2. 1-D SOM lattice is used for training of neurons and the
dimension of input vector in our case is 2, i.e., X and Y coordinate, each neuron carries a
1-by-2 weight vector. The weight of two neurons is set to uniform random values such
that 0<W<1. In our simulation, the initial values of neighborhood size (i.e., σ0), SOM
learning rate (i.e., L0), and length of rough training (λ2) are selected as 1.2, 0.01, and 15
respectively.
Since we plan to attack three different nodes in the IEEE-57 bus system, we have
three different initial cluster centers. The dimension of the sample input vector in our case
is 2, i.e., X and Y coordinate and hence these cluster centers also carry a 1-by-2 weight
vector. The weight of three cluster centers is set to uniform random values such that
0<C<1.
2.4.2 SOM and K-means clustering
From Fig. 2.5, it can be seen that 39 buses (nodes) of IEEE-39 bus system
benchmark are grouped into two different clusters using SOM. Similarly, Fig. 2.6 shows
that the 57 buses (nodes) of the IEEE-57 bus system are grouped into three different
clusters using K-means algorithm. Centroid of each cluster is represented by a solid
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Figure 2.5. Two clusters of IEEE 39 bus system using SOM
Figure 2.6. Three clusters of IEEE 57 bus system using K-means
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(green) circle in both the clustering results.
2.4.3 Performance comparison
2.4.3.1 Power system model based on network connectivity
In this model, a load of a particular node is calculated using equation (2.1). Based
on the loading information of all nodes, an attack was initiated on power system
benchmark from both traditional load-based and proposed clustering-based approach. For
traditional load based strategy, the nodes are sorted according to their initial load and find
the most loaded ones to form the initial victim set. In IEEE-39 bus system, it is found that
nodes 16 and 26 are the most loaded ones and in 57 bus system nodes 15, 13 and 9 are
most loaded nodes. These set of nodes are selected to form the initial victim set for
traditional load based attack strategy. In order to study the cascading failure process, the
initial set of nodes are knocked down in both benchmark system. This causes the
redistribution of the load in remaining nodes according to equation (2.2) and it is observed
that some of the nodes are overloaded beyond their capacities. Next, these overloaded
nodes are also knocked down. This process is repeated several times until the system
achieved a final steady state. Finally, the number of survived components in steady state is
evaluated and PoF is calculated using equation (2.9).
To further explain the cascading phenomenon, failure of different nodes are
presented in successive time steps for IEEE-39 bus system at system tolerance of 1.6 as
shown in table 2.2. The benchmark is simulated in Matlab for calculation and
redistribution of load. Nodes 16 and 26 in gray colored cells are knocked down to initiate
an attack. These set of nodes corresponds to the load based attack strategy. As these
34
Table 2.2. Cascading events for IEEE 39 bus system at tolerance of α =1.6.
Bus No.
Initial load Capacity Round of cascading events
Li (C) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
1 12 19.2 12 12 12 12 24.1 0 0
2 36 57.6 36 36 36 58.0 0 0 0
3 27 43.2 27 27 54.5 0 0 0 0
4 27 43.2 27 27 53.3 0 0 0 0
5 30 48 30 30 30 60.4 0 0 0
6 36 57.6 36 36 36 36 74.1 0 0
7 14 22.4 14 14 14 14 14 52.6 0
8 21 33.6 21 21 21 21 43.2 0 0
9 10 16 10 10 10 10 10 23.2 0
10 21 33.6 21 21 21 51.15 0 0 0
11 27 43.2 27 27 27 27 102.2 0 0
12 12 19.2 12 12 12 29.2 0 0 0
13 24 38.4 24 24 47.3 0 0 0 0
14 24 38.4 24 49.6 0 0 0 0 0
15 16 25.6 25.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 60 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 27 43.2 43.3 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 12 19.2 12 27.5 0 0 0 0 0
19 24 38.4 38.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 8 12.8 8 36.0 0 0 0 0 0
21 16 25.6 25.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 18 28.8 18 43.6 0 0 0 0 0
23 18 28.8 18 43.6 0 0 0 0 0
24 16 25.6 25.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 27 43.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 41.2 82.9 0 0
26 40 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 14 22.4 21.3 49.1 0 0 0 0 0
28 14 22.4 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3
29 21 33.6 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0
30 4 6.4 4 4 4 4 8.0 0 0
31 4 6.4 4 4 4 4 4 6.4 0
32 3 4.8 3 3 3 3 8.1 0 0
33 3 4.8 3 13.5 0 0 0 0 0
34 2 3.2 2 2 38.0 0 0 0 0
35 3 4.8 3 3 5.8 0 0 0 0
36 3 4.8 3 3 8.4 0 0 0 0
37 3 4.8 3 3 3 3 3 85.9 0
38 3 4.8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
39 8 12.8 8 8 8 8 8 32.1 0
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victim nodes are knocked down to initiate an attack, the load carried by those victim
nodes gets redistributed to their immediate neighbors. Now the updated load is calculated
using equation (2.2) and compared with their capacity. If their updated load is higher than
capacity, i.e., if they are overloaded then these nodes are again knocked down in next time
steps. The overloaded nodes in different time steps are represented by bold figures in the
table.
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Figure 2.7. Performance comparison of traditional load based and clustering based attack
for IEEE-39 bus system based on network connectivity.
For clustering based approach, the mostly loaded nodes from each cluster are
selected to form the initial victim set. For 39 bus system it is found that node 16 and 2 are
the most loaded ones and in 57 bus system nodes 9, 13 and 12 are the most loaded. The
load redistribution process and the cascading phenomenon are similar as described for a
traditional load-based attack strategy. PoF for the clustering-based attack is calculated and
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Figure 2.8. Performance comparison of traditional load based and clustering based attack
for IEEE-57 bus system based on network connectivity.
compared with traditional approach for both benchmark system. From Figs. 2.7 and 2.8, it
is observed that the clustering-based attack is able to find the victim set with nodes
carrying less load but with greater impact than the traditional load based strategy.
2.4.3.2 Power system model based on actual power flow
In this approach, the victim nodes are selected based on the load defined by equation
(2.4). The power flow information is obtained from PowerWorld and Matpower for 39 bus
system and 57 bus system respectively. After calculating the load of each bus, the attack is
initiated by selecting victim set for both traditional load-based and clustering-based
strategy. For traditional load-based strategy, nodes 6 and 39 are found to be most loaded
for 39 bus system. Whereas for 57 bus system, nodes 8, 1 and 12 are most loaded. These
set of nodes are the initial victims which are knocked down to trigger a cascading event.
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Table 2.4. Cascading events for IEEE 39 bus system at tolerance of α =1.25.
Bus No.
Initial load Capacity Round of cascading events
Li (C) 1st 2nd
1.0 116.3 145.4 0.0 0.0
2.0 481.5 601.9 872.2 0.0
3.0 398.8 498.5 897.5 0.0
4.0 500.0 625.0 1274.2 0.0
5.0 482.8 603.5 769.0 0.0
6.0 910.0 1137.5 0.0 0.0
7.0 426.8 533.5 233.8 0.0
8.0 523.0 653.8 763.0 0.0
9.0 12.1 15.1 0.0 0.0
10.0 650.0 812.5 650.0 0.0
11.0 350.3 437.9 31.9 0.0
12.0 7.5 9.4 31.8 0.0
13.0 299.7 374.6 642.4 0.0
14.0 292.9 366.1 717.8 0.0
15.0 320.1 400.1 397.4 320.0
16.0 823.9 1029.9 822.7 808.8
17.0 204.1 255.1 183.8 158.3
18.0 192.3 240.4 183.7 158.2
19.0 629.2 786.5 629.0 614.3
20.0 680.2 850.3 680.2 680.3
21.0 604.6 755.8 604.2 604.4
22.0 650.0 812.5 650.0 650.0
23.0 601.3 751.6 601.4 601.4
24.0 353.8 442.3 353.9 353.8
25.0 538.3 672.9 538.3 224.0
26.0 409.6 512.0 512.8 0.0
27.0 281.9 352.4 372.9 0.0
28.0 347.5 434.4 347.8 206.0
29.0 824.8 1031.0 824.7 490.1
30.0 250.0 312.5 741.0 0.0
31.0 571.3 714.1 9.2 9.2
32.0 650.0 812.5 650.0 0.0
33.0 632.0 790.0 632.0 617.1
34.0 508.0 635.0 508.0 508.0
35.0 650.0 812.5 650.0 650.0
36.0 560.0 700.0 560.0 560.0
37.0 540.0 675.0 540.0 224.3
38.0 830.0 1037.5 830.0 491.9
39.0 1116.3 1395.4 0.0 0.0
38
For clustering based approach, the mostly loaded nodes from each cluster are selected to
form the initial victim set. Based on Fig. 2.5, nodes 38 and 39 are selected from two
different clusters for 39 bus system. Similarly for 57 bus system, nodes 8, 1 and 13 are
selected as initial victim set as shown in Fig. 2.6. These nodes are marked with a red
circle in clustering results of both benchmark system.
To explain the cascading process in this model, load based attack in IEEE-39 bus
system is considered. Nodes 6 and 39 are knocked down initially to initiate an attack. As
these victim nodes are knocked down, the load carried by those victim nodes is
redistributed according to basic circuit laws. Unlike the previous model, it is observed that
the load redistribution is not only limited to immediate neighbors and independent of the
initial load of nodes. The updated load of nodes are calculated using branch flow
information from PowerWorld. Next, the overloaded nodes are identified and knocked
down in successive time steps. The whole process is summarized in table 2.4.
Finally, the number of survived components in steady state is evaluated and PoF is
calculated using equation (2.9). Performance comparison in Figs. 2.9 and 2.10 suggests
that clustering-based attack is more efficient than load-based attack in searching of
vulnerable components which can cause greater damage in power system benchmark. In
addition, Fig. 2.9 shows different behavior of SOM based attack from system tolerance of
1.75 to 2.5 which represents system blackout. In this simulation, when system tolerance is
increased from 1.75 to 2.5 in SOM based attack, nodes 4, 26, and 27 (nodes with some
MW of demand) survived due to increased capacity, whereas nodes 5, 13, 14, and 17
failed, which represented a pathway for power to flow.
39
Figure 2.9. Performance comparison of traditional load based and clustering based attack
for IEEE-39 bus system based on power flow.
Figure 2.10. Performance comparison of traditional load based and clustering based attack
for IEEE-57 bus system based on power flow.
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2.4.4 Transient stability
In this case, the transient stability analysis with a large disturbance is investigated.
Our benchmark IEEE-39 bus system consists of ten synchronous generators. The
transients in rotor angle of all generators after a large disturbance is observed. A balanced
three-phase fault is created at t = 1s and cleared at t = 1.2s in two different pair of nodes,
i.e., nodes 6 & 39 (load based) and nodes 38 & 39 (SOM-based). Following this
disturbance, the frequency of synchronous machines undergo transient deviations and the
power angle of these machines will oscillate over time. The oscillations, unless damped,
can lead to grid failure causing the system to collapse. The main objective is to study
whether the rotor angles return to a steady state value to maintain synchronism following
the clearing of disturbance.
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Figure 2.11. Rotor angle of generators for load based attack.
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Figure 2.12. Rotor angle of generators for SOM based attack.
Figs. 2.11 and 2.12 shows the rotor angles of all ten generators for a load based
attack (i.e., nodes 6 and 39) and the SOM-based attack (i.e., nodes 38 and 39) respectively.
For the load based attack, it is observed the rotor angles of all ten generators are able to
achieve a new steady state after the damping process. Thus, the system is able to achieve
synchronism with the transition from one equilibrium state to another. For the SOM-based
attack, it is observed that the rotor angles diverge over time and most of the generator’s
rotor angles are overlapped as shown in Figure 2.12. Synchronous generators are not able
to return to a new equilibrium state with new steady state rotor angles. This situation is
not expected in power systems and is referred to as “going out of step” or “loss of
synchronism”. This supports our investigation that an attack at nodes 6 and 39 is less
vulnerable than at nodes 38 and 39.
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2.5 Summary
The simulation of cascading failure for power system benchmark using the concept
of network connectivity ignores the actual power flowing through the buses. This concept
assumes that in any interconnected network, the nodes having a greater number of
connection with its neighbors should take a higher amount of load for delivery. Also, the
load redistribution after the failure of a parent node is limited to its immediate neighbors
only. But this is not always true in power system network because the power flowing in
the electric grid depends on demand at a particular node, generating units in a node, and
transmission line parameters. For simplicity, the cascading phenomenon in the electric
power grid can be explained based on network connectivity. However, the results are not
supportive to study the real cascading event in power system as it ignores load loss, the
formation of isolated networks and system blackout.
The concept of load flow is introduced in addition to network connectivity to
calculate the actual burden of a node by taking power flow into considerations. During
simulating the cascading process using real power flow information, the formation of
isolated networks as well as load loss is taken into account to calculate the severity of
damage. The performance comparison of two different attack strategies is made based on
the failure of a number of grid components. It is observed that preserving both the
electrical features and topological information of grid can assist in selecting most
vulnerable components in cascading failures. Thus, for both test cases, the
clustering-based strategy is more effective than traditional load based strategy in selecting
the victim sets for initiating an attack to cause the cascading failure.
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Not only substations, transmission lines are also vulnerable to different kinds of
failures in the power system. Because of the loss of transmission lines, the imposed limits
of the power system components gets violated and it goes into emergency condition. So, it
is required to study the effect of outages in terms of severity. However, it is challenging to
deal with each and every combination of the outage to evaluate its consequences. In the
following chapter, the detailed explanation of proposed approach for finding vulnerable
branches during contingency experiments efficiently will be provided.
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CHAPTER 3 ELECTRICAL DISTANCE APPROACH FOR CONTINGENCY
ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
The electric power grid is regarded as one of the critical infrastructures in the world.
It is a complex network consisting of numerous components like generators, transformers,
transmission lines, circuit breakers, etc. As the power systems continue to increase in size
and complexity because of grid modernization, cascading events leading to blackout are
more likely to happen. U.S. electricity consumers incur a loss of almost $80 billion
annually because of power interruptions [53]. The operation of the power grid has also
changed dramatically due to change in the way the system is being owned and operated
because of deregulation. With the aim of increasing reliability and efficiency of the power
grid, the use of advanced information and communication technology is incorporated in
addition to the physical infrastructure [54], [55]. However, security is a critical issue in the
operation of such cyber-physical system because of increasing malware from cyber side to
compromise the physical components. Since many large scale electrical disruptions have
occurred in the past [56], [57], it has become necessary to ensure the operation of power
systems economically and reliably.
3.1.1 Power system security
A detailed security assessment is essential in dealing with all credible outages in the
system, its consequences and the remedial actions for them. For a power system to be
secure, it must have a continuous supply of power without loss of load. With this aim,
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security analysis is performed to develop various control strategies to guarantee the
avoidance and survival of any emergency conditions. Whenever the imposed limits of the
power system get violated, the system is said to be in emergency condition. The limits can
be line limit, voltage limit or generation limit and these violations of the limit occurs due
to contingencies occurring in the system. Thus an important part of the security analysis
revolves around the power system ability to withstand the effect of any contingencies. An
important factor in the operation of the power grid is the desire to operate it robustly
because any kind of unplanned outages could lead to cascading events or even costly
blackouts. One of the major agenda of power system planning and its operation is to study
the effect of outage in terms of severity. Power system security also involves the
contingency analysis where the simulation is conducted for the list of possible outages so
as to give system operators a symptom of how a system will behave in an event of
unscheduled failure of power grid components.
3.1.2 Contingency analysis
Contingency analysis (CA) is a well-known function in modern energy management
system (EMS) to ensure power system security during equipment failure. It assists
engineers to operate power system at a secure operating point, where transmission lines
are loaded within their safe limit and consumers are provided power with acceptable
quality standards [58]. In general, an outage of one transmission line or transformer or
combination of different outages may lead to overload in other branches and/or sudden
system voltage rise or drop. CA is used to calculate violations and analyse those
violations for maintaining system security. It executes a power flow analysis for each
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credible contingency event defined on the contingency list [54], which in turn helps to
identify the thermal and voltage violations. Results after each power flow study are
compared with limits of each element in the power system to identify the violations. For
instance, a transmission line that was loaded at 80% of its MVA rating before any event
might be overloaded above 100% after some outages in the system.
Introduction of new North American Reliability Corporation (NERC) Standards
necessitate the system operators to ensure that the performance of power system is within
the operating limits such that all single and multiple contingencies do not result in
cascading outages [59]. While these standards mandate the power industry to consider
multiple contingencies, it is still challenging to solve the problem due to a high number of
possible events. Multiple approaches have been proposed previously to address the
complexity problem of N− k contingency. Because of the way the power system is
designed and operated, not all the outages will actually cause trouble. Hence, most of the
time and effort spent while running power flow experiment will go for solutions which
discover that there are no any violations in the system. In fact, only a few of the power
flow solutions will conclude an overload or voltage violation in the system. The solution
to this situation is to find an efficient way to select only those contingencies that are likely
to result in an overload of branches or voltage limit violations.
3.1.3 Related work
Contingency screening or contingency selection is an essential task in contingency
analysis which helps to reduce the numerous computations. Contingency selection
criterion based on the calculation of performance indices has been first introduced by
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Ejebe and Wollenberg [60], where the contingencies are sorted in descending order of the
values of performance index (PI) reflecting the severity. However, the results were not
reliable and to improve the reliability, authors in [61] proposed the use of higher-order
sensitivities. One way to gain speed of solution in a contingency analysis procedure is to
use an approximate model of the power system. Linear sensitivities using the DC power
flow solution in contingency analysis is computationally much faster, however, this
approach will not catch all of the contingency violations due to the underlying
assumptions [62]. The 1P−1Q (one P−θ calculation and one Q−V calculation) method
for contingency selection using fast decoupled load flow has been presented in [63] where
solution is interrupted after one iteration. The application of Genetic Algorithm for
contingency ranking has been studied in [64] where the ranking problem is formulated as
an optimization problem with an objective of finding the critical cases. Ranking of
contingency based on risk index along with the likelihood of each contingency and
severity is computationally efficient and could be used for power system security
assessment [65]. Inspired from [66], multi-element contingency screening algorithms
were able to detect nearly all contingencies resulting violations by solving small number
fraction of possible contingencies [10]. The screening algorithms considered linear
sensitivities like line outage distribution factor (LODF) as well as flow and line limit
information. Non-heuristic selection procedure for N−2 contingency problem based on
the idea of iterative pruning of the possible candidate sets was proposed in [67]. Eppstein
et al. [68] developed a randomized algorithm based approach for identifying a minimum
N− k contingency that initiates a failure in the system as a sequence of cascading outages.
A cyber-physical environment for security assessment was introduced in [69] by including
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both accidental contingencies and malicious compromise of cyber assets with the aim of
identifying the possible contingencies through cyber attacks. A novel heuristic algorithm
for identifying critical N−2 contingencies resulting overload during post-contingency
condition was proposed in [70] where the authors claimed its zero missing rates in DC
approximation model.
Despite the fact that plenty of algorithms for N− k contingency screening were
proposed in last 3 decades, most of the aforementioned literature still require running of
power flow for various combination of contingencies to identify the vulnerable branches
for security assessment. With this consideration, an electrical distance approach is
proposed for searching of vulnerable branches efficiently during a single and double
outage in the system. A new connection of power system is defined based on the electrical
distance between nodes or buses using the inverse of an admittance matrix (i.e., an
impedance matrix). The entries of non-sparse impedance matrix are pruned in order to
obtain a comparable structure in consistent with original topological structure. Both N−1
and N−2 contingency analysis are performed to analyze the post-contingency results in
vulnerable branches. This method is more efficient to search vulnerable branches and
reduce computational complexity during contingency screening. Also, it is not required to
conduct power flow experiment for each possible events. In addition, the effect of loss of
vulnerable branches on bus voltage profile is studied to validate the proposed approach.
3.2 Mathematical Formulation of Contingency Analysis
A well-known Full-Newton method is used for analysing the system behavior
during pre and post contingencies. This method will determine the overloads and voltage
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limit violations more accurately than approximate DC power flow. The relationship
between node current I and node voltage V for a particular node i in a network of n nodes
is given by the linear equation,
Ii =
n
∑
k=1
YikVk (3.1)
where Yik is an element of the admittance matrix connecting nodes i and k. Following
equation (4.6), complex power at node i is given by,
Si =ViI∗i (3.2)
Pi + jQi =Vi
n
∑
k=1
Y ∗ikV
∗
k (3.3)
Equation (3.3) represents real and reactive power flowing in ith branch. Tripping of some
set of transmission lines changes the topology of grid which is reflected in admittance
matrix, Ybus matrix. The updated Ybus matrix is then used to redistribute the branch flows
after any outage of transmission line/s. The algorithm for AC power flow security analysis
with contingency case selection is shown in Algorithm I. Each of the possible event is
simulated by removing the elements defined in contingency list by updating the model.
The post contingency flow in branches are tested for overloads and all the limit violations
are reported. The impact of line outages is illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
Figure 3.1. Contingency result for outage in power system. The lines identified in circle
are overloaded due to outage of line/s identified in rectangle.
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This figure illustrates the post contingency flow due to outage of particular line/s
which are identified in rectangle. Only those lines which are carrying power beyond their
limit are presented in the list (shown in circle) and their percentage loading due to outage
is represented as f a,b, where f is the percentage loading of line a due to outage of line b.
For example, during N−1 contingency shown in first row, f 3,1 represents the
percentage loading of line 3 due to outage of line 1. Similarly, during N−2 contingency
shown in second row, f 3,1&2 represents the percentage loading of line 3 due to
combined outage of lines 1 and 2.
Algorithm 1: Traditional contingency analysis
Input: List of possible outages, Thermal limits
Result: Alarm list containing overload branches
for all list of possible outages do
1. pick outage i from the list and remove that
component from the model
2. run AC power flow in the updated model
if post contingent flow> thermal limit, then
create list for vulnerable branch;
else
identify system as secure for that outage;
end
end
Although NERC requires maintaining power grid security against N−1
contingency, they are still vulnerable to events which involve multiple component failures,
i.e., N− k contingency. So, as multiple outages are taken into considerations the number
of events to be simulated grows rapidly and screening is intractable when k > 1. The
number of total contingencies to handle for k outages with N number of branches in a
system is given by,
Total =
(
N
k
)
=
N!
k!×(N− k)!
(3.4)
51
For k = 1 the total number is simply N which corresponds to N−1 contingency and for
k = 2, the total number of combination is given as,
(
N
2
)
=
N!
2!×(N−2)!
=
N(N−1)
2
=
(N2−N)
2
(3.5)
Equation (3.5) suggests that for maintaining system security against N−2
contingency requires analyzing events in the order of N2. In general, for simulating a k
number of outages, O(Nk) power flow solutions are required to process. The number of
transmission lines in the power system can be linearized with a number of buses (n) in the
system, i.e., N ≈ 1.5n [10]. Based on this the computational complexity can be expressed
as function of n as,
O(Nk) = O((1.5n)k) = O((1.5)k(n)k) = O(nk) (3.6)
The use of Newton’s method for power flow adds some computational effort in
solving multiple outage contingency analysis. The elements of Jacobian matrix are 2×2
blocks of real numbers and computational effort for required factorization for n number of
buses is O(n1.4) [71]. In this thesis, third order outage is considered as a highest order, and
following equation (3.6), the computational complexity for k = 2 is given as
CE = O(n1.4).O(nk) = O(nk+1.4) = O(n3.4). (3.7)
Equation (3.7) suggests that finding the critical combinations of contingency is
challenging even for modest values for N and k. So, to determine the vulnerable branches
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in the system for unseen events without any qualitative assumptions can be the remedy of
this complexity. The proposed approach is discussed in the following section.
3.3 Proposed Electrical Distance Method
3.3.1 Different structure of power grid
This section discusses the proposed method for finding vulnerable branches for any
probable outages in the system. A new network structure is proposed based on electrical
distance which is referred as electrical structure of the network. It will have a same
number of the node to node connections as that of topological structure. The topological
structure is an electrical power network formed from the admittance matrix (Ybus). This
new electrical structure is then compared with an original topological structure in order to
explore the vulnerable branches. Here, “compare” means to find the branches that are
common in both topological and electrical structure. In order to study the structure of
power grids from a complex networks perspective, the electrical structure, as well as its
topology, needs to be studied. Since flow in electrical networks is governed by Kirchoff’s
law, this results in unique patterns of interaction between nodes in a network.
The bus admittance matrix defined by equation (3.8) captures the topological
structure of power system network.
Y lsbus =

Gls + jBls, if l 6= s
−∑(Gls + jBls) if l = s
0, if no connection exists
(3.8)
Per definition, the Ybus matrix tends to be sparse as the value of some entries is 0 if nodes l
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and s do not have a direct physical connection. The admittance matrix, Ybus for W&W 6
bus network [72] in Fig. 3.2 is shown in Table 3.1. This matrix shows all 11 branches of
the system which can be represented by non-zero entries in the upper or lower triangular
matrix.
Table 3.1. Ybus for W&W 6 bus system.
Ybus bus 1 bus 2 bus 3 bus 4 bus 5 bus 6
bus 1 4.0 - j11.8 -2.0 + j4.0 0 -1.2 + j4.7 -0.8 + j3.1 0
bus 2 -2.0 + j4.0 9.3 - j23.2 -0.7 + j3.8 -4.0 + j8.0 -1.0 + j3.0 -1.5 + j4.5
bus 3 0 -0.7 + j3.8 4.2 - j16.6 0 -1.5 + j3.2 -1.9 + j9.6
bus 4 -1.2 + j4.7 -4.0 + j8.0 0 6.2 - j14.7 -1.0 + j2.0 0
bus 5 -0.8 + j3.1 -1.0 + j3.0 -1.5 + j3.2 -1.0 + j2.0 5.3 - j14.2 -1.0 + j3.0
bus 6 0 -1.6 + j4.5 -1.9 + j9.6 0 -1.0 + j3.0 4.5 - j17.0
3.3.2 Measure of electrical distance
There are variant measures of electrical distance for a power network ([73], [74]),
but one of the efficient ways is the absolute value of the inverse of the system admittance
matrix. To define the electrical distance in our work, the absolute value of the inverse of
the Ybus matrix is used which is a non-sparse (dense) matrix, i.e., Zbus= |Y−1bus |. The power
system network is coupled by the following equation,
Figure 3.2. Single line diagram of W&W 6 bus system [72].
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YV = I (3.9)
where V and I represent the bus voltage and injected current vectors respectively; and Y is
the admittance matrix. Suppose a network has n nodes and m branches or links, each link
has an impedance z = r+ jx where r is resistance and x is reactance. The line admittance
can be written as,
y = g+ jb = 1/z (3.10)
where g is conductance and b is susceptance of any branch. Assume that a unit current
flows along the link from node l to s which causes the voltage difference between ends of
link equal to δv = V (l)−V (s) = Zls. Therefore Zls can be interpreted as the electrical
distance between two nodes. It is also important to note that, electrical distance (Zbus=
|Y−1bus |) does not perfectly represent all of the ways in which components in a grid connect,
it is a useful starting point for structural analysis [43]. More mathematical justification of
the proposed approach can be found in [75] and [76]. The distance matrix, Zbus is a full
matrix where each element Zls reflect the propagation of the voltage variation following a
current injection in a given node pair throughout the system [77]. Since Kirchhoff’s and
Ohm’s laws provide connectivity among all nodes pair in the system, the graph defined
from electrical distance matrix Zbus is fully connected. For the system shown in Fig. 3.2,
there will be 15 links in the system as defined by,
p =
n2−n
2
(3.11)
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where n is number of nodes in the network and p is the total number of connecting links
between each node pair. These connections are represented by entries of electrical
distance matrix, Zbus given in Table 3.2. Each term of the matrix (Zls or els) describes the
amount of connectivity between node pairs in the system.
Table 3.2. Equivalent Zbus for W&W 6 bus system. Each entry represents the amount of
coupling between pair of nodes.
Zbus bus 1 bus 2 bus 3 bus 4 bus 5 bus 6
bus 1 3.6404 3.7041 3.7251 3.6963 3.7149 3.7236
bus 2 3.7041 3.6744 3.7089 3.6970 3.7146 3.7066
bus 3 3.7251 3.7089 3.6446 3.7221 3.7092 3.6800
bus 4 3.6963 3.6970 3.7221 3.6515 3.7166 3.7203
bus 5 3.7149 3.7146 3.7029 3.7166 3.6678 3.7091
bus 6 3.7236 3.7066 3.6800 3.7203 3.7091 3.6444
The equivalent electrical distance between nodes s and l is thus given by the
magnitude of the relevant entry of the Zbus. A small value of els corresponds to a shorter
electrical distance but a stronger coupling between these nodes (s and l). This reflects a
larger propensity for power to flow between these nodes.
3.3.3 Formation of new electrical structure
A graph representation of the electrical structure of the system from the electrical
distance matrix, Zbus can be generated. The algorithm for representation of electrical
structure graphically is given in Algorithm 2. Since Zbus is a non sparse matrix, it will
reflect all possible links between the nodes present in network. In the electrical structure,
the number of nodes n will be same as a topological network. But the existing m links in
the topological network will be replaced by m smallest entries from the upper or lower
triangle of Zbus matrix (since Zbus is symmetric). This means the new electrical structure
will have a same number of the node to node connections as that of topological structure.
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Algorithm 2: Graphical representation of Zbus matrix
Input: Ybus, Threshold (t)
Result: Adjacency matrix with elements als
Graphical representation of electrical network
Zbus= |Y−1bus |;
for every element of (Zbus) do
if els < t, then
als=1;
draw connection between node l and s;
else
als=0;
end
if als ∈ Y lsbus, then
branch als exist;
else
branch als does not exist;
end
end
Hence, the total p connection links of Zbus matrix will be reduced to m by calculating the
proper threshold value. With these newly selected connection links,there will be a
different topology than the original network which is electrical structure of the system.
The elements of the adjacency matrix, A of this new network will be defined as follows,
als =

1, if els < t
0, if els ≥ t
(3.12)
where els is any term of Zbus matrix and t is the calculated electrical distance threshold in
order to capture the same number of links as the previous network. Next, the branches in
an electrical network are compared with topological connections and it is observed that
some branches are common in both structures. So, using the adjacency matrix A and Ybus
matrix, the common connections under the set n(T ∩E) are observed, where T represents
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the set of topological connections and E represents the set of electrical connections
obtained from pruned Zbus matrix. The remaining connections are those which do not have
a physical connection between the nodes. The steps to represent the electrical structure
graphically and to compare it with topological structure is shown in Algorithm 2. After
finding the most important electrical branches from an electrical distance, contingency
analysis is performed in power system test cases. With the aim of finding the most critical
or vulnerable branches, attention is paid to those branches that are important according to
our proposed model and also have physical connections between the nodes.
3.3.4 Discussion on the proposed method
The computational complexity for N−2 contingency as given by equation (3.7) is
O(n3.4) and this complexity increases to O(n4.4) if N−3 contingency (k = 3) is
considered. In our proposed work, the only computational cost is the calculation of
inverse of n × n matrix and this cost is independent of multiple outages taken into
account. According to [78] and [79], the computational cost for obtaining inverse of
matrix is O(n2.373) which is less than traditional contingency analysis.
Our proposed approach is discussed in finding the critical branches based on
impedance matrix. In our approach, the formulation is same as that in references [43] and
[80] such that smaller value of electrical distance corresponds to the larger propensity for
power flow between the nodes. It is also true that loading will impact the location of
critical branches. However, during the early stage of power system planning and
operation, the transmission line parameters are adjusted based on the loading. This means,
a line which has to carry higher MW has different line parameter (impedance) than the
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Figure 3.3. IEEE-24 bus one-line diagram and node branch representation of the system
exactly following the one-line diagram. The number in node are in accordance with the bus
number.
line which needs to carry less MW. So, the line criticality is closely related to its
parameters which are reflected in terms of electrical distance. Hence, loading will impact
the location of critical branches and this will be somehow reflected in terms of electric
connectedness between the nodes.
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3.4 Simulation Results
In this section, the IEEE-24 bus system is used as a test case to illustrate the
electrical distance approach for selecting vulnerable branches. This system is obtained
from Illinois Center for Smarter Electric Grid (ICSEG) [81]. It has 38 transmission lines
with 6 transformers, which are given unique numbers as shown in Fig. 3.3. The
transmission lines are numbered so that it helps identify the failed and overloaded
branches during contingency analysis. The node positions and system admittance matrix,
Ybus is obtained from PowerWorld. The dense impedance matrix (Zbus) is then calculated
by inverting Ybus matrix. Following equation (3.11), the total number of distinct node to
node connections for 24 bus system is calculated as [(242−24)/2] = 276.
3.4.1 Case I: Contingency analysis based on electrical distance
In addition to the one-line diagram, Fig. 3.3 also shows the topological structure
(node-branch representation) of the IEEE-24 bus system using the bus (node) position and
connections between branches according to admittance matrix. Algorithm 2 presented in
Section 3.3 is applied to IEEE 24 bus test case system to generate the equivalent electrical
structure of the network. Initially, the Zbus matrix is made triangular since the node pair
i− j and j− i represents the same connection between the nodes. Then each entry is
selected and its impedance value is compared with remaining entries. The entries with
higher impedance are made zero and the ones with lower impedance are kept unchanged
in Zbus matrix. The total nonzero elements of the matrix are counted to find the total
number of connections whose impedance are less than that of the selected entry. The
particular element or entry which gives a number of connections equal to that of the
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topological structure is tagged as a threshold value. However, it is not always necessary
that a particular entry will itself be a threshold value and give exact required number of
non-zero elements in Zbus. In such case, it is necessary to adjust the nearest impedance
value by trial and error method to find exact threshold value. For IEEE-24 bus test case,
among 276 entries, 228th entry is obtained as the threshold value of 0.4090 which gave a
number of connections equal to 38.
Figure 3.4. Node-branch representation of different structure of power grid network; (a)
Dense electrical structure showing connection among all node pairs; (b) Important elec-
trical connections with number of connections equal to number of branches in topological
structure (Fig. 3.3); (c) Electrical connections that are physically present in benchmark
system.
With the calculated threshold value, out of 276 total electrical connections (Fig.
3.4a), only 38 strongest electrical connections are presented. The links shown in Fig. 3.4b
represents the 38 different node-node connections and hence it is size-compatible with the
topological structure. The two representation of the 24 bus network suggests different
structure. From an electrical perspective (which captures the behaviour of the network,
not simply the physical structure), 24 bus network seems to have a distinct group of nodes
that are electrical hubs. That is, those buses have a high electrical connectivity to the rest
of the network. Power flowing through the network as governed by Kirchhoff’s law is
more likely to pass through these nodes than the remaining other nodes. In language of
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Figure 3.5. Venn-diagram showing sets of transmission lines belonging to different network
structure. The color of marks represents the different structure of power system network
and are in analogous to Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4.
social networks, these nodes are often referred to as nodes with “high betweenness” or
“information centrality” [80]. It is not necessary that all the electrical connections defined
by adjacency matrix A will be physically present in the original system. So, particular
connections are searched, which are electrically important according to our approach and
exist in the topological structure as well. Fig. 3.4c shows particular branches in the system
which have the shortest electrical distance (electrically important connections) and are
common between topological structure and electrical structure. The set of branches
belonging to a different structure is also represented in Venn-diagram in Fig. 3.5 where
the color of marks represent branches from different network structure. The branches
belonging to n(T ∩E) are physically connected branches in the benchmark, and they are
not selected based on their impedance value. So, it is not necessary that they have
higher/lower impedance value of branches belonging to n(E).
After finding the electrical structure of 24 bus system, it is simulated for N−1,
N−2, and N−3 contingency analysis to observe different possible scenarios in the
post-contingency analysis. With the loss of single (N−1) or a combination of
transmission lines (N−2 and N−3), there occurs power flow redistribution in the
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network. This forces some of the remaining transmission lines to carry power beyond
their line limit. During contingency analysis, only real power flow is considered for
checking the line limits, and voltage limit violations are not accounted in this research.
For example, loss of line 3 causes lines 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 10 to carry power beyond
their capacity and forces them to be overloaded. An illustration of post contingency
analysis for single outage is shown in Fig. 3.6. The circles contain a line identifier or
name and the post contingent flow (in terms of percentage of their limits) for an outage of
line identified in the rectangle.
Table 3.3. Contingency analysis for IEEE-24 bus system showing line index and number
of times it is violated for N−1, N−2, and N−3 contingencies
S.No
Line Impedance Number of violations
Index Zls N-1 N-2 N-3
1 1 0.3570 31 453 4167
2 2 0.4085 28 372 3218
3 3 0.3802 30 429 3903
4 4 0.3862 29 402 3541
5 5 0.3979 6 149 1767
6 8 0.3997 3 75 898
7 9 0.3962 6 155 1923
8 10 0.3906 1 28 365
9 6* 0.4111 - - 1
Total line limit violations 134 2063 19783
*→ line not captured by electrical distance approach
Figure 3.6. N − 1 contingency analysis results for loss of line 3 and line 6. The line
identified in circles are overloaded lines due to outage of line identified in rectangle. The
number in circle represents the percentage loading of lines.
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Figure 3.7. N − 2 contingency analysis results for lines 3&6 and lines 6&8. The line
identified in circles are overloaded lines due to outage of line identified in rectangle. The
number in circle represents the percentage loading of lines.
Similarly, Fig. 3.7 shows the post contingent flow in branches for an outage of a
combination of lines, i.e., N−2 contingency. One key thing to observe from this analysis
is that the line which is overloaded during an outage of a particular line (N−1 outage)
might not be overloaded for a combination of outages involving the previous line. For
example, line 4 is overloaded due to loss of line 6 whereas it is not during the loss of line 6
and line 8 together. But it is obvious that N−2 is more severe than N−1 when observing
their overall impact. Based on these post contingent flow for all single and higher order
contingency list, the total number of violations and violated lines are identified. In
IEEE-24 bus system, there are 134 line limit violations for N−1, 2063 line limit
violations for N−2 and 19783 line limit violations for N−3 contingency respectively.
These violations are contributed by various branches in the system. Table 3.3 shows the
line identifier, their impedance and the number of times it is violated for defined
contingency. There are 8 branches which are loaded beyond their capacity by different
line outages in the system for N−1 and N−2 contingency. There is one extra line whose
line limit is violated for N−3 contingency and the line index suggests that except line 6,
all of these lines are connections in the electrical network which are also present in the
topological structure, i.e., physically present in Fig. 3.3. This means all the sensitive or
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Table 3.4. Descriptive statistics for power system test cases
Test No. of No. of No. of Gen. Load Voltage
cases Buses Tr. Lines Generators MW MW level (p.u.)
W&W 6 6 11 3 219.52 210 0.92-1.00
IEEE-14 14 20 5 272.39 259 1.01-1.09
IEEE-24 24 38 11 1701.58 1619 0.92-1.00
IEEE-30 30 41 6 300.95 283.4 0.99-1.08
G&S-37 37 57 10 819.17 808.72 0.99-1.03
IEEE-39 39 46 10 6191.28 6149.5 0.98-1.07
vulnerable branches for contingencies are being captured using electrical distance
approach for N−1 and N−2. For N−3 contingency, 1 out of 19783 line limit violations
is missing from being captured, however, the total percentage of violations captured under
electrical distance is still 99.99%.
Algorithm 2 is applied and outage for different contingency combinations are
simulated for several power system benchmarks. A 6-bus system is built in PowerWorld
using all branch and loading information from [72]. A design project case with 37 bus and
57 transmission lines is taken from [82]. Similarly, remaining IEEE test cases are directly
accessed from Illinois Center for Smarter Electric Grid (ICSEG) [81]. The descriptive
statistics for the power system test cases used in this research are provided in table 3.4.
Table 3.5 summarizes the contingency analysis results. The total number of violations and
line identifier of the violated lines that contributed for those recorded violations are
observed. The total number of violations due to N−1, N−2, and N−3 contingencies
captured by important electrical branches are expressed in percentages and a total number
of sensitive lines for each contingency are reported. A total number of sensitive lines
means the total number of branches which are overloaded during to N−1, N−2, and
N−3 contingency experiments. It is observed that “most of the violations” are associated
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with those branches which are obtained from electrical distance approach and have a
physical existence in the power system network as well. Here, the term “most of the
violations” is used for those benchmarks where all the violations are not captured by
electrical distance approach. As shown in table 3.5, in some test cases, the violations
captured under electrical distance is not 100%. For example, in IEEE-39 bus system
during N−1 contingency, the total number of violations captured by electrical distance
approach is 85.0% which means out of total 20 violations, 17 violations are from the lines
which have strongest electrical connections. Similarly, during N−2 contingency analysis,
86.5% of total 557 violations are captured by electrical distance approach. Remaining 75
line limit violations are from those transmission lines which are not identified as
vulnerable based on our approach.
The results for contingency analysis in different power system test cases suggest
that electrical distance approach for searching the vulnerable branches is more efficient
and does not require power flow experiment for each probable event in the power system.
With this proposed method, the computational effort in solving thousands of possible
outages during higher order contingency to predict the effect of outages can be reduced.
3.4.2 Case II: Loss of sensitive branches and voltage profile
All the simulations set up for this case study are the same as that for Case I. Here,
the effect in voltage profile of system is studied with loss of transmission line. In any
power system, transmission lines have a limited capability for power transfer, as well
known from circuit theory [83]. This limit marks the onset of voltage instability where the
system is not able to maintain the steady voltage at all buses in the system after being
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subjected to a disturbance from a given initial condition.
Based on our proposed approach of electrical distance, there are some branches in a
system that are identified as critical during contingency analysis and those branches are
among having small electrical distance. The different set of branches belonging to the
electrical and topological structure are shown in Fig. 3.5. To verify the proposed approach
for selection of critical branches, the bus voltage profile is studied for loss of a particular
branch in the system. Two branches are selected from a set of critical lines which are
under the set n(T ∩E). And, two other branches are selected which are not captured in
electrical connections and belong to set n(T )-n(T ∩E). These branches are opened one by
one at t = 1sec during normal operation condition. Transient stability analysis is done for
these disturbances to see the change in voltage level of all 24 buses.
During normal operating condition, the voltage profile of the system is between 0.92
p.u. and 1 p.u. as shown in Fig. 3.8. First, line 1 is removed and the change in voltage
level of all the buses is observed. This caused the voltage of several buses to decrease
around 0.8 p.u. and increase above 1.1 p.u. which are beyond the normal operating range
as shown in Fig. 3.8a. Again, line 4 is opened which is also identified as critical line
according to our approach. Fig. 3.8b shows the degradation in voltage profile because of
loss of another critical line. This decline in voltage level is not desired in power system
and can damage the load or eventually lead to voltage collapse.
Similarly, two different branches from set n(T )-n(T ∩E) are selected. Lines 19 and
22 are opened at t = 1 sec and voltage profile is observed for both the cases. Fig. 3.9
suggests that these disturbances have a minimal effect in the system voltage profile and
only few bus voltages are found to be declined below normal operating point of 0.92 p.u..
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Figure 3.8. Voltage profiles for loss of sensitive branches.
Figure 3.9. Voltage profiles for loss of least sensitive branches.
In addition, the voltage distribution of all 24 buses for loss of branches in the system
are studied. Fig. 3.10 shows the upper and lower voltage level of buses for an outage of
each branch set. The blue mark represents the upper voltage level and black mark
represents the lower voltage level for a particular loss. The red marks show the voltage
level of particular buses which are beyond the range specified by the green line, and the
x-axis shows the corresponding index of the branch. The line index suggests that the line
captured in n(T ∩E) caused the voltage to distribute beyond ±10% limit (i.e., below 0.9
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Figure 3.10. Voltage distribution for loss of branches. Red mark represents the bus voltage
that is out of normal operating range and number refers to the buses whose voltage is mostly
affected by loss of particular branch.
p.u. or above 1.1 p.u.). For example, when line-1 is removed from the system, the bus
voltage of all 24 buses ranges from 1.1308 to 0.8094. Our result shows that the deviation
of voltage level from the defined boundary is because of loss of branch which belongs to
n(T ∩E) set. This suggests that branches with strongest electrical connections are more
critical and hence their outage has a severe impact in the voltage.
3.5 Summary
A method of searching vulnerable or critical branches is studied to avoid the
computational expense of processing higher order outage event. In our proposed approach,
the vulnerable branches are screened through the electrical distance between node pairs,
so that the candidate search in contingency analysis for all possible events can be avoided.
This significantly reduces the computational cost while having the ability to identify
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almost all vulnerable branches in the system. Our experimental results show that branches
with small electrical distance are identified as vulnerable for N−1, N−2 and N−3
contingency. Study of the voltage profile of system for transmission line loss validated our
proposed approach for searching the vulnerable branches. Based on vulnerable branches
initial flow, loading limit, and the way power system is being operated, the identification
alone can help in decision making during power system outage. Correspondingly, power
system security can be enhanced by making those branches more rigid or re-scheduling of
generator output in order to decrease the burden on these particular branches.
Contingency analysis is a critical activity in the context of the power infrastructure
because it provides a guide for resiliency and enables the grid to continue operating even
in the case of failure. A critical issue with the current evolution of the power grid into a
so-called smart grid is the introduction of cyber-security threats due to the pervasive
deployment of communication networks and information technologies. So, in addition, to
having plans for the accidental contingencies, it is also required to study the power system
behaviour for malicious compromises. This requires a model of a cyber-physical system
including interactions among cyber and physical components. In the following chapter, a
cyber-physical power system testbed is provided which can be used to assess potential
impacts of both cyber and physical contingencies as well as to investigate the mitigation
efforts.
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CHAPTER 4 CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM TESTBED
4.1 Introduction
Smart grid is a modernized electrical grid and is generally referred as the next
generation power system. For the purpose of sensing, monitoring, protection and control,
information and communication technology system are being deployed in the modern
power system. With this integration, the smart grid is expected to greatly enhance
efficiency, reliability, and economy of power production and consumption along with the
integration of renewable energy resources, as well as demand response and distributed
intelligence [84]. Although the current smart grid initiatives are expanding the use of
information technologies to modernize the existing grid, their adoptions in cyber-physical
systems (CPS) have introduced power system security issues. Attacks on either cyber or
physical parts of the smart grid will possibly impact the stability of the entire system.
4.1.1 Vulnerabilities in Smart Grid
As there is growing dependency of nations infrastructure on the cyber domains,
these systems become an attractive target for well-trained attackers. The combination of
an increasingly interconnected power grid and cyber domains presents concerns for the
grid’s current security posture. As shown in Fig. 4.1 threats could target the generation,
transmission, distribution, and market domains. Unfortunately, as smart grid security
concerns have grown, researchers have begun to identify the vulnerabilities within both
cyber and physical domains. Analysis from Department of Homeland Security and Idaho
National Laboratory have revealed that most of the serious vulnerabilities are prevalent
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Figure 4.1. Model of different types of electric power utility [88].
through ICS software platforms and network configurations [85], [86]. North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) from the private sector has also acknowledged
the threat to the electric power grid. NERC created a cyber attack task force (CATF) in
order to explore the vulnerabilities in cyber domain and identify proper detection
capabilities. The “High-Impact, Low-Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk
Power System” report released by NERC in 2009 highlighted major threats to the grid,
specifically the coordinated attacks blending both cyber and physical methods [87].
4.1.2 Research needs
Recent research in a cyber attack against smart grid has shown that these intentional
attacks can have an impact on power system operation in terms of stability and economy.
For example, authors in [11] commented that cyber attack in measurements of static var
compensator (SVC) or static synchronous compensator (STATCOM) can degrade the
system’s stability margin. Cyber attacks including false data injection attacks can mislead
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the state estimating process [89] or even can impact the economic operation of electric
power market operations by manipulating the nodal price [12]. Similarly, denial of service
(DoS) attacks in the cyber layer of smart grids can affect the dynamic performance of
physical power system [90]. It is also important to verify the device settings, algorithms,
and application before they are deployed in the real power system to avoid any unfortunate
incident. For example, malfunctioning of relays can lead to false tripping of breakers
which can cause cascading failures. In this case, cyber-physical testbeds can serve as a
tool for simulating the power system model accurately and also helps to understand the
complex relation between cyber and physical domains. Although United States
Department of Energy (DoE) is giving considerable attention to the security
enhancements of the cyber-physical power system, the research related to cyber attack and
impacts are constrained by the availability of realistic cyber-physical system testbed.
4.1.3 Related work
Suitable power system testbeds are needed in order to accurately capture the attack
effects, attack impacts in a physical system, and possible mitigation strategies as well as
control algorithms to ensure stability and security of power grid. Several cyber defense
testbeds have been developed at various entities such as national labs, universities, and
research centers for the purpose of studying the consequences associated with these
cyber-physical threats and mitigate those consequences. The researchers at national
SCADA testbed at Idaho National Laboratory investigated how a cyber attack can cause
damage to a physical system through an aurora generator test [13]. In the experiment, the
researcher used a computer program to open and close the breaker out of phase from the
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grid to maximize the stress. Virtual control system environment (VSCE) was developed at
Sandia National Laboratory which uses hybrid modeling and simulation architecture in
order to understand the possible impact of particular cyber threats, cyber defense training
and exploring power system vulnerabilities [91].
Beside national labs, universities and research institutes are also focusing research
in the development of a CPS testbed for cyber security issues. A testbed has been
developed at University of Arizona using PowerWorld and MODBUS protocol to detect
cyber attacks on SCADA system [92]. In this work, authors presented compromised
human machine interface (HMI) and denial of service as different attack scenarios.
Authors in [93] suggested various applications of testbed developed at Mississippi State
University. The proposed testbed was used for simulation of common power system
contingencies (generator loss, transmission loss, and sudden load loss), and event
detection using data mining of phasor measurement unit data. Similarly, a power system
cyber-physical testbed was developed for intrusion detection and it also provides a
platform for hardware in the loop (HIL) simulation, cyber-attack and generated data sets
for developing and validating an intrusion detection system for monitoring power system
events [94]. The SCADASim testbed has been developed at Royal Melbourne Institute of
Technology University for building SCADA simulations which support a combination of
network simulation and real device connectivity [95]. It helps to analyze the effects of
malicious attacks like denial of service, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle and spoofing
on the devices and simulated network. Emerging smart grid distributed control algorithms
were examined in the developed smart-grid cyber-physical system testbed where authors
highlighted the impacts of different interactions in the operation of micro-grid [96]. A
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cyber-physical security testbed at University College Dublin [97] provides an accurate
tool for analyzing cyber-physical vulnerabilities, allows monitoring of the dynamic
behavior of power system as a response to cyber attacks (impact analysis), and mitigation
of cyber attacks. For analyzing the physical impact due to compromise in the cyber
network, a cyber-physical contingency analysis framework was introduced in [69] for both
accidental contingency and malicious compromise. The impact of three different types of
real-life cyber attacks namely, communication line outage, denial of service and
man-in-the-middle attack in physical power grid was studied through the proposed testbed
developed at Washington State University [98]. Other related CPS power testbed research
have been discussed in [99], [100], [101].
Research efforts have been made worldwide from industry, academia and national
laboratories for the development of real-time cyber-physical testbed. The realistic
cyber-physical environment achieved from these testbeds is helpful for investigating
power system vulnerabilities, mitigation strategies, and system behavior during different
kinds of conditions for our research.
4.2 Proposed Cyber-Physical System Testbed
A. Testbed Application
A CPS testbed needs to have certain capabilities to provide the realistic
cyber-physical environment. This section provides the various research applications of a
cyber-physical power system testbed. The comprehensive set of testbed application areas
is shown in Fig. 4.2 and are elaborated below in detail.
1. Vulnerability analysis: The vulnerability is any weakness that an intruder takes
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benefit of in order to compromise the security goals (confidentiality, integrity, availability
or authenticity) of smart grid [102]. In the cybersecurity context, it is equally important to
incorporate both cyber and physical layers of the power system for vulnerability analysis
[97]. The vulnerability might be associated with communication protocols, firewall or
VPNs, sensing and monitoring devices in a substation or even in control centers.
However, unavailability of these technologies publicly is the main constraint for
vulnerability assessment. A real-time cyber-physical testbed provides an environment to
analyze the weakness as well as testing of these platforms and architectures.
2. Disturbance scenarios: Different disturbances can be simulated in a real-time
CPS testbed. They might be an attack or any dynamic events within the power system. For
example, an attacker can trigger a circuit breaker to isolate a transmission line during
normal condition or there might be a sudden increase in demand at a particular time. Such
events can be simulated in real time and the consequences can be analyzed to propose the
necessary mitigation and control strategies.
3. Impact analysis: This is one of the important applications of a testbed which
involves quantifying the effects of given event on the physical electrical grid and provide a
degree of damage based on power delivery disruptions [103]. The physical impact from
possible cyber attack, power system faults, and power system contingencies can be
evaluated from the CPS testbed. The interdependency between cyber and physical part of
power system makes the analysis part more complicated. In addition, a testbed helps to
analyze the impact of potential cyber attacks and physical hazards in terms of power
system’s stability, reliability, and economic operation so that operating personnel can have
a clear idea about the potential damage that can happen because of a particular event.
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Figure 4.2. Application areas of the CPS testbed.
4. Stability and control: It is always desired to have power system ability to move
from one steady-state following a disturbance to another stable operating point without
loss of synchronism and without having unacceptable frequency deviations [82]. CPS
testbed facilitates the simulation of major disturbances like loss of generation, faults and
sudden changes in load. The control strategies like adaptive dynamic programming based
supplementary control [104] can be implemented within the testbed in real-time for
efficient damping of the oscillations and help the multi-machine system return to the
synchronous frequency with new steady state power angles.
5. Cyber-physical assessment metrics: Threat and damage are much easier to
describe than to measure them. For evaluating the damage in the cyber-physical
environment, metrics must combine both cyber and physical properties. Development of
metrics helps to improve ability to understand the damage, control it and even defend
against it. Physical metrics may include the quantified impact in power flow, change in
system’s stability, loss of load, percentage of failure, the risk if failure and even effects in
markets [12], [40]. Similarly on the cyber side, metrics can be evaluated based on
probabilities of vulnerability, vulnerability criticality and different other methods like
artificial intelligence (AI) assessments techniques, models of security measurements,
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concrete measurement methods and so on [105].
6. Mitigation module: Depending on the impact caused by an attack or any change
in system configuration, a mitigation strategy can be proposed and its effectiveness can be
explored in the CPS testbed in real time. This feature helps to bring the system back to
normal condition after going through some transients. It will help to protect the system
from further damage that might result from a single initiating event and reduce the
vulnerabilities of the power system infrastructure.
7. Training and Education: The CPS testbed is a platform for academic purpose and
will be useful for gaining knowledge related to cyber security of the smart grid. Users can
have the ability to interface with the power system operations and controls during different
kind of disturbances and attacks being simulated in the testbed. In addition to research,
with the help of data visualization and user-friendly modeling environment, testbed can be
used for educational purposes to study different real scenarios in the power system.
B. Testbed Architecture
The architecture of cyber-physical testbed at South Dakota State University (SDSU),
highlighting the cyber, physical, control, and communication system is shown in Fig. 4.3.
1. Physical System: Power system simulation in this testbed is performed using two
different tools, OPAL-RT, and RT-lab. OPAL-RT is a platform equipped with analog and
digital I/Os that provides the capability to perform real-time experiments by interfacing
with real hardware devices like protection relays. RT-LAB, fully integrated with
MATLAB/Simulink is the open real-time simulation software environment. The test case
to be simulated is modeled using the SimPowerSystems (MATLAB/Simulink) Toolbox.
The reason behind using SPS is that the models built in SPS are compatible with
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Figure 4.3. Schematic architect of the proposed cyber-physical microgrid testbed.
OPAL-RT and can be executed in real time. In order to achieve hardware in loop
simulation, some specific blocks from [106] are added to SPS model in order to access the
analog and digital ports of the real time simulator. The power system model used in the
simulation is based on the Western System Coordination Council (WSCC) 3 machine, 9
bus test case [107]. The system consists of three generating units at buses 1, 2, and 3, and
three loads at buses 5, 6, and 8. Two microprocessor based relays or IEDs equipped with
current and voltage input modules are used as a protection system for two different
transmission lines. The algorithms or settings incorporated in their microprocessor utilize
the measured signals from OPAL-RT to detect any fault or anomalies in the power system.
These relays generate trip signal once they detect any abnormal condition. The generated
trip signal is used to open the circuit breaker, send information to the control center or
communicate with other devices and controllers for protecting the system [108]. The
three-phase current of the transmission lines is sent to analog outputs of the simulator and
these signals are then fed into the CT inputs of the respective relay. The output contact of
the relay is connected to the digital input of simulator to open the circuit breaker in the
SPS model. The current flowing through the lines is constantly monitored through
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human-machine interface tool. The settings of the relay are adjusted/modified using
AcSELerator Quickset through PC.
2. Cyber, Control and Communication: In this testbed, SEL-C662 based
communication is used between intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) and the user
interface in substations where the user interface acquire the monitored data from relays.
The distributed network protocol DNP 3.0 is used for control and measurements between
the control center and substation which is similar to many real-world SCADA systems.
The testbed control center can support general SCADA functions like collecting
measurements and field device status from substations, giving commands to an operator
working with the field devices and even store the collected data on the server for future
reference. In the testbed environment illustrated in Fig. 4.3, intrusions are possible from
remote access connections to a substation communication network. Thus, via VPN an
attacker can intrude into the substation network and perform malicious attempts like
modify data packets, eavesdropping, and compromise user interface.
4.3 Experimental Study on Cyber Security
4.3.1 Parameters and environment setup
Based on the testbed architecture described in section 3.4, a real time
hardware-in-loop simulation environment is developed based on OPAL-RT. Fig. 4.4
shows the hardware setup of proposed CPS testbed in Micro-grid lab of South Dakota
State University.
Two SEL 351S relays are connected to PC for human machine interface and current
flow through the transmission lines being protected (line 7-5 & line 7-8) is constantly
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Figure 4.4. Hardware setup in Micro-grid lab at SDSU.
monitored. A simple triggering circuit is built to utilize the relay contact for the opening
of the breaker in Simulink. The WSCC 9 bus system is simulated in RT-Lab and a PC is
used to launch an attack in one of the protected transmission lines. Here, it is assumed that
attacker has penetrated into the substation and has compromised the human machine
interface.
A trip signal is sent by an attacker from relay #1 at t = 5.29s during normal
operating condition and hence the line 7-5 is opened at t = 5.29s. This loss of transmission
line forces the line 7-8 to carry all the power generated at bus 2. Hence, the current in line
7-8 increases by a significant amount. The current in line 7-8 is constantly monitored and
is being protected from over-current through relay #2. The settings in the relay are
adjusted in such a way that whenever the current exceeds the limit for a predefined time,
the line is taken off from the system to prevent the damage caused by over-current. The
settings are implemented through overcurrent curve where U.S. very inverse curve is used
for defining the operating time. Fig. 4.5 shows how the operating time is calculated based
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on multiples of pickup. The equation associated with this U.S. curve is given as [109],
tp = T D(0.0963+
3.88
M2−1
) (4.1)
where tp is operating time in seconds, T D is time-dial settings which is 2 in our case
and M is applied multiples of pickup current (for tp, M > 1).
4.3.2 Experiment results
During this experiment, it is observed that the current flow in line 7-8 is increased
from 193.68 A to 333.74 A after the loss of line 7-5. It is assumed that the transmission
line 7-8 is designed to carry a maximum current of 250 A. This overcurrent in line 7-8 is
detected by the relay and based on provided settings, it sends a trip signal to open the line
for preventing further damage due to overload.
Figure 4.5. U.S. Very Inverse Curve [109]. This curve is drawn based on equation (4.1).
Using equation (4.1), operating time of relay is calculated as,
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(4.2)
tp = T D× (0.0963 +
3.88
M2 − 1
)
= 2× (0.0963 + 3.88
(333.74250 )
2 − 1
)
= 10.114s
Figure 4.6. Current in transmission line 7-8. Current increases after 5.29s and due to relay
settings, the line 7-8 is opened at 15.30s after which the current is zero.
If the over-current persists till this period, the relay reaches the maximum time for
withstanding the thermal overload and it will send the command to the breaker for the
opening of the line. Once the line is tripped, the current flow through it reduces to zero as
shown in Fig. 4.6. Because of simultaneous tripping of both the lines, the generation
station at bus 2 is isolated. This causes the remaining generators at bus 1 and bus 3 to
supply the load in the system. The impact of the attack on power system is shown in Figs.
4.7 and 4.8.
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Figure 4.7. Impact of attack on system voltage.
Fig. 4.7 shows how the system voltages are impacted by the attack and Fig. 4.8
shows the change in real and reactive power generation as a result of the attack. Each of
these figures has two major events which took place as a part of the attack. The first event
represents the tripping of line 7-5 by an attack and the second event represents the tripping
of line 7-8 by operating personnel to prevent it from overload. Fig. 4.7 shows that the first
event did not cause much impact on the system voltage and the voltage at all buses stayed
close to 1.0 p.u. However, after the tripping of the second line, the generator at bus 2 is
completely isolated from the grid and this impacted the voltage at several buses
significantly. From Fig. 4.8, it can be observed that the tripping of line 7-5 changes the
generation in all three generators by a small amount, but tripping of line 7-8 completely
isolates generator 2 from the system and therefore it results in a huge loss of generation.
Such event could cause some frequency stability problems in a real power system.
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Figure 4.8. Impact of attack on generation: (a) Real power generation from three genera-
tors; (b) Reactive power generation from three generators.
4.3.3 Mitigation using optimal power flow
In order to protect the system from being unstable, some emergency control action
should be taken before the loss of line 7-8. One of the mitigation strategies is to use
optimal power flow (OPF). The goal of OPF is to determine the best way to
instantaneously operate a power system. Usually, “best” means to minimize the operating
cost or minimize the control change by taking some constraints into consideration. In our
case, the only constraint is the current limit of line 7-8 as 250 A. The generator cost
function of all three generators for this system are given by [52],
C.F1 = 0.11×P2 +5×P+150
C.F2 = 0.085×P2 +1.2×P+600
C.F3 = 0.1225×P2 +1×P+335
(4.3)
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4.3.3.1 Solution 1
Primal linear programming (LP) OPF solution is used to optimize the system. The
objective function is to minimize the operating cost by rescheduling of the generator.
Solving a primal LP OPF changes system control to remove any violation. It determines
the optimal solution by iterating between solving a standard power flow and then solving a
linear program. So, the quadratic input/output model (non-linear cost functions) given in
equation (4.3) are approximated into piecewise linear model as a series of straight line
segments.
Table 4.1. Generator rescheduled after OPF.
Generator
Max. Output Power Output (MW)
(MW) Before attack After OPF
1∗ 250 71.63 121.21
2 300 163 100.21
3 100 85 100.00
*→Most expensive generator
The OPF results in Table 4.1 shows how the generators are optimally dispatched
while simultaneously enforcing the transmission line limit. The system is now at new
operating condition and current through line 7-8 is found to be 247.28 A. It is observed
that the generation from generator 2 is decreased because of the transmission line limit
(line 7-8) and generator 3 is limited by its maximum capacity. So, to fulfill the demand,
the most expensive generator is increasing its output. When the system is under OPF AGC
control, all generators output are varied automatically by AGC in conjunction with the
solutions solved by the OPF algorithm [110]. This also helps to maintain the system
frequency while minimizing operating costs and satisfying all necessary constraints.
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4.3.3.2 Solution 2
In addition to the rescheduling of the generator, optimal power flow is also used
with dispatchable loads to relieve transmission overloading. The generator cost functions
for this case are similar to that as given in equation (4.3). In this case, the objective
function is to minimize the control change and OPF will seek to relieve transmission
overloads with the minimum change from the initial operating point [111]. This objective
function will enable load and generation control (generator controls are also needed to
follow any changes in load) with OPF. The first step is to ensure that each load in the
system is AGCable and OPF load dispatch is enabled in the area. The simulation result is
shown in Fig. 4.9 where the OPF solution has curtailed the load at bus 5 by 44.7 % to
relieve the overload in branch 7-8. With the new configuration, the current flow in line 7-8
is observed to be 246.82 A.
Figure 4.9. OPF mitigation simulation for load curtailment.
Hence, optimal power flow can be used as one of the effective mitigation strategies
which help to adjust the power flows to restore a normal operating condition.
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4.4 Summary
A real time cyber-physical testbed is presented to simulate different attacks and
disturbances in the smart grid. The discussed testbed is a valuable tool for simulating
events in the realistic cyber-physical environment. It is used to demonstrate the impact of
the cyber attack on the physical power grid in terms of voltage stability and loss of
generation. A mitigation strategy is also proposed using optimal power flow for
preventing the system from being unstable.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusions
The smart grid is enjoying the integration of latest technology for efficient and
reliable operation. Its integrated nature and inclusion of different communication
paradigms is making the modern power system more intelligent and economic. However,
it is facing some critical problems because of its structural vulnerability and cyber security
issues. This thesis has focused on the security of modern power grid from three different
perspectives.
First, the cascading failures caused by potential attacks in the power grid was
studied. The vulnerability of power grids from the attackers perspective is investigated.
The attackers will always want to compromise the particular grid components which will
trigger a cascading failure causing blackout of large size. Two different models of power
system were discussed and performance comparison of various attack strategies was
presented. The selection of initial victim sets for causing cascading failure should be done
preserving both topological and electrical structure of the grid since neither of them is
robust enough to provide comprehensive evaluation of failure propagation alone.
Clustering based attack was found to be more critical as it causes greater damage in the
power system benchmarks. In addition, the model based on power flow was found to be
more realistic in studying the cascading failures in the power grid.
Second, the screening of vulnerable branches was done based on electrical distance
approach. It was observed that the proposed approach is computationally efficient than the
traditional contingency analysis method. The vulnerability of the branches was examined
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based on their impedance values. The proposed algorithm is applied in different power
system test cases for N−1, N−2 and N−3 contingencies. The number of line limit
violations during single and multiple contingencies were found to be associated with
branches under the electrical structure, i.e., branches with smallest electrical distance. The
proposed approach was found to be efficient in comparison to traditional methods for
screening of the vulnerable branches during contingencies. Study of the voltage profiles
further supported that the branches with smallest electrical distance are more prone to
vulnerability.
Finally, the development and applications of a CPS testbed were discussed. The
application of a CPS testbed was provided and the architecture of developed platform was
presented. The physical and cyber domains of the CPS testbed were discussed and their
interdependencies was evaluated based on the potential cyber attack. The impact of the
possible cyber attack in the physical power system was studied in terms of system
voltages and generation loss. The effectiveness of the mitigation strategy can be evaluated
using the testbed before implementing it in the real power system cases.
5.2 Future work
The future work along this direction includes the following major tasks:
1. Consider both the node (substation) capacity and line limits during cascading failure
process and visualize the failure propagation in large scale power grid, which
consists of thousands of substations and transmission lines. In addition, the
cascading model could be improved by introducing dynamic condition of the power
system.
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2. Simulate the cascading failure phenomenon using the developed testbed in real time.
The effect of multi-node attack could be simulated in proposed testbed and evaluate
the damage, as well as defense the attack for preventing failure propagation.
3. Integration of distributed energy resources like solar, wind and storage devices
(battery) in real-time CPS platform for investigating the systems’ reliability during
unplanned outages and malicious attacks.
In general, all these works are expected to enhance the smart grid security against
potential attacks and failures.
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